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The Government Must Step 
In to Secure Cyberspace
National security demands a heightened
emphasis on corporate information security.
Companies that assume that cyber issues
are low priority are whistling past their
own future graveyard.
Cyber Security Really 
Is Not an IT Problem
Despite the obvious IT aspect of cyber
security, it is the business managers, not
the technologists, who must do the real
heavy lifting to protect the Internet infra-
structure and the information it carries.
“Since it is private industry
that owns and operates
the vast majority of what
constitutes the Internet,
it is therefore industry’s
responsibility to demonstrate
leadership in the fight to
secure cyberspace.”
— Larry Clinton, 
Guest Editor
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that managers face are complex enough to
merit examination that goes beyond simple
pronouncements. Founded in 1987 as
American Programmer by Cutter Fellow
Ed Yourdon, Cutter IT Journal is one
of Cutter’s key venues for debate.
The monthly Cutter IT Journal and its weekly
companion Cutter IT E-Mail Advisor offer a
variety of perspectives on the issues you’re
dealing with today. Armed with opinion,
data, and advice, you’ll be able to make the
best decisions, employ the best practices,
and choose the right strategies for your
organization.
Unlike academic journals, Cutter IT Journal
doesn’t water down or delay its coverage of
timely issues with lengthy peer reviews. Each
month, our expert Guest Editor delivers arti-
cles by internationally known IT practitioners
that include case studies, research findings,
and experience-based opinion on the IT topics
enterprises face today — not issues you were
dealing with six months ago, or those that
are so esoteric you might not ever need to
learn from others’ experiences. No other
journal brings together so many cutting-edge
thinkers or lets them speak so bluntly on
issues such as:
 Proving the value of IT ROI
 The give and take of offshore outsourcing
 The value of high-quality data
 The evolution of agile project management
 When and how to kill a dying project
Cutter IT Journal subscribers consider the
Journal a “consultancy in print” and liken
each month’s five or six articles exploring a
single topic to the debates they participate in
at the end of a day at a conference — with
every participant in the conversation forcefully
expressing his or her viewpoint, backing it
up with data and real-life experience. 
Every facet of IT — application integration,
security, portfolio management, and testing,
to name a few — plays a role in the success
or failure of your organization’s IT efforts.
Only Cutter IT Journal and the Cutter IT E-Mail
Advisor deliver a comprehensive treatment
of these critical issues and help you make
informed decisions about the strategies that
can improve IT’s performance.
Cutter IT Journal is unique in that it is written
by IT professionals — people like you who
face the same challenges and are under the
same pressures to get the job done. The
Journal brings you frank, honest accounts
of what works, what doesn’t, and why.
Competition remains intense in the high-tech
world. Budget cutbacks and short deadlines
have become the norm. You need advice and
experience you can rely on. Put your IT con-
cerns in a business context. Discover the
best ways to pitch new ideas to executive
management. Ensure the success of your IT
organization in an economy that encourages
outsourcing and intense international compe-
tition. Avoid the common pitfalls and work
smarter while under tighter constraints. You’ll
learn how to do all this and more when you
subscribe to Cutter IT Journal.
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In the call for papers for Cutter IT Journal’s edition on
cyber security, we asked, “Is it time to change our
strategy?” Apparently, the answer is a resounding “yes.”
Nearly every article we received (enough to necessi-
tate a second edition on this topic to be published in
August) called for fairly fundamental shifts in strategy
to address a problem that most evidence suggests is
growing like a malignant tumor — and which we may
understand far less how to treat.
We received submissions from senior US government
officials, major universities, think tanks, and corporations
spanning Europe, Asia, and North America. The articles
dealt with a wide array of issues, ranging from the macro
concerns regarding how terrorists might use cyber war-
fare to inflict severe physical pain on large populations,
down to more micro issues such as newly emerging
forms of spam over wireless and VoIP technology. How-
ever, despite the breadth of contributors and topics
covered, virtually every author essentially echoes the
view offered in our lead article by Bob Stephan, US
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Assistant
Secretary for Infrastructure Protection: “In today’s
world, the traditional security paradigm is shifting
to encompass the unique challenges presented by the
digital landscape.” 
In addition to the notion that a new paradigm would be
needed to address the lack of cyber security, there was
broad consensus, although not unanimity, on several
key points: 
 The problem is alarming and growing.
 The very nature of the Internet, and the constant
change surrounding its maturation, makes the
problem of securing cyberspace substantially more
difficult. 
 The problem cannot be viewed simply as a “tech”
problem, although that is how it has been and
continues to be largely characterized.
 We don’t have a solution yet, but when we come
up with one, it will need to be multifaceted and
international.
While there is no one solution offered — indeed the
authors in this issue identify a multitude of problems at
various levels of abstraction — each of the articles does
offer concrete advice to guide the reader in addressing
the issues raised herein.
WE NEED TO BE TOGETHER — BUT WE’RE NOT
Over the past few years, we have heard an ever-louder
drumbeat in the popular press, and from some politi-
cians, for stricter government regulation of the Internet
as a response to the problem of information security. My
own organization, the Internet Security Alliance, takes a
somewhat different view by maintaining that since it is
private industry that owns and operates the vast major-
ity of what constitutes the Internet, it is therefore indus-
try’s responsibility to demonstrate leadership in the fight
to secure cyberspace. This philosophy should not be con-
fused with a laissez-faire approach that expects the invis-
ible hand of the market to magically remedy the serious
problems we are facing. Quite the contrary: the inherent
characteristics of the Internet demand a far more inten-
sive and creative effort to ameliorate the situation than
will likely be accomplished via regulatory fiat. 
In fact, when I asked DHS Assistant Secretary Stephan
to contribute to this edition of Cutter IT Journal, I did so
because I knew he would reflect the critical perspective
that the cyber security issues we all face cannot be
addressed unilaterally by either government or indus-
try. We need the sort of new, creative government-
industry partnership Stephan speaks of in his article.
Unfortunately, we are only at the preliminary steps of
creating such a functional working relationship.
There is a great deal to commend in Stephan’s article
and his work at DHS to increase the profile of cyber
security issues and integrate them into the broad effort
to assure homeland security. Stephan correctly points
out that causing cyber mischief has never been easier,
or more threatening, and that the traditional models for
predicting incidents is no longer reliable in the current
environment. He argues that we must create a coordi-
nated risk management approach to bring coherence to
by Larry Clinton
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the cyber security efforts of the US federal government,
local governments, international partners, and industry
worldwide. He outlines the approach DHS is currently
suggesting via the draft National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP), which is currently being circulated to inter-
ested parties for comment.
Stephan and his DHS colleagues are, quite appropri-
ately, motivated by the vital need to ensure national
defense. Perhaps it is unfortunate, but the common
good is not what motivates the private sector when it
comes to allocating resources for the portions of the
cyber infrastructure it must defend. Even the most
patriotic of corporations make investment decisions
based on their corporate self-interest, and hence no plan
for constructing a comprehensive cyber defense can be
complete if it does not directly address the economic
motivations affecting industry.
WHAT WE DON’T KNOW IS A LOT
Our second article, by Shari Lawrence Pfleeger, Rachel
Rue, Jay Horwitz, and Aruna Balakrishnan of the
RAND Corporation, tees up this issue nicely. In their
abstract, the authors began with the troubling, but accu-
rate, observation that “even when the technology to
secure cyberspace is available and reasonably priced,
individuals and corporations don’t always use it.” 
In their article, Pfleeger et al. review the available litera-
ture to see what we actually know about the economics
of cyber security. The short answer is, “not all that
much.” They note that little effort has gone into creating
a method to accurately account for the direct and indi-
rect costs of cyber incidents. As a result, both industry
and government are left without a solid basis for mak-
ing informed decisions. 
The authors also report on a series of studies of interest
to people (like myself) who believe that until the
dynamism of the market is interwoven systematically
into an incentive program to encourage private-sector
investment in cyber defense, we’re not going to get
very far. For example, they cite studies on the positive
influence of information sharing as well as studies that
suggest creative mechanisms such as the use of “vulner-
ability markets” (similar to the market in pollution cred-
its in the US) or more aggressive use of cyber insurance.
We expect to review some of these topics in greater
detail in our second installment later this year.
PLUG AND PLAY — NOT
The Software Engineering Institute’s Carol Woody
moves us from the realms of broad public policy para-
digms and research needs down to the actual opera-
tional issues organizations face in maintaining secure
systems. Like her RAND colleagues, she begins with a
troubling observation: “Great authorization and authen-
tication will not save a system from poorly planned
implementation and sustainment. ... After implementa-
tion is when the security problems will show up. The
developers move on, and the operational and sustain-
ment support staff do the best they can.”
The major problem Woody focuses on is the increas-
ingly complex security management issues generated
by organizations’ reliance on COTS software. Orga-
nizations like to think that COTS components are
“mature, stable, and adhere to well-recognized industry
standards.” She suggests that the reality of systems built
using such components is more of “a Rube Goldberg
mix of glue code.” 
Adding to the problem, Woody argues, is the virtually
constant changes necessitated by the various vendors’
individualized update schedules. Updates can trigger a
complete restructuring of the system, placing the orga-
nization in a “damned if you do and damned if you
don’t” situation. If you apply the updates, you have to
constantly monitor their interaction (and overhaul your
system if it “breaks”); if you don’t, you may face secu-
rity problems and even the loss of maintenance support. 
Even more insightful is Woody’s analysis of how typical
management issues — reliance on current ROI models,
the trend toward outsourcing, and organizational
IN NEXT MONTH’S ISSUE
The Role Of Strategy, Planning, and Budgeting
in An Agile Organization
Guest Editors: Bob Benson, Tom Bugnitz, and Bill Walton
Not all organizations are in agreement about the critical
nature of strategy, planning, and budgeting in an agile busi-
ness environment. Applying traditional approaches for the
sake of meeting objectives oftentimes results in misdirected
managerial attention, the stifling of innovation and creativity,
and the inability to focus on new priorities. How can strategy,
planning, and budgeting processes be redefined to better
support agile methods? Join us next month for an inspiring
debate replete with best practices and guidelines for meeting
the dynamic business objectives of an agile organization.
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structures geared to legitimate but non-security con-
cerns — complicate an already dicey problem.
PHISHING, PHARMING, SPAM, SPIM, AND SPIT
Our last three pieces bring us directly into operational
issues at very concrete levels.
Lee Imrey of the US Department of Justice provides some
compelling math that explains why phishing has become
one of the fastest-growing crimes of the past year. 
He also notes almost the exact same problem Woody
identified in the previous article — namely, the irre-
sistible force of time in our fascinating and rapidly
changing industry and how difficult that makes things.
He observes, “Unfortunately, the detective measures
currently on the market face the same challenges that
antivirus vendors have faced for years. ... By the time
any solution gets to market, there is a group of dedi-
cated, well-funded, and highly motivated professionals
working to defeat that solution.” As a result, “Entire
industries are chasing their tails in trying to resolve
this problem.”
In keeping with the notion of new paradigms, Imrey
suggests that we would be better off thinking of phish-
ing not as the problem to be solved, but as a symptom
of a larger issue, namely the reliance on old techniques
for authenticating users’ identities when more enlight-
ened and effective techniques may be near at hand.
Accompanying Imrey’s article is a sidebar offered by
M. Vidyasagar of Tata Consultancy Services in India.
Vidyasagar offers a case study of how his large and
growing corporation addressed the need to rethink its
security model as part of a fully integrated Enterprise
Management Program to address Tata’s rapidly evolv-
ing business and technological needs. A significant
aspect of this security overhaul was the implementation
of just the sort of time-synchronized two-factor authen-
tication Imrey advocates.
Finally, Charalampos Patrikakis of the National
Technical University of Athens, Greece, and Anastasios
Pallas of the University of Paisley, Scotland, give us a
glimpse at the future of spam. It’s not a pretty picture.
As if it weren’t bad enough that the ubiquitous problem
of spam is continuing to grow both in size and cost,
now the scourge is mutating. As Imrey reported with
regard to phishing, spam (and its ugly stepsisters SPIM
and SPIT) always seems to be one step ahead of the
sheriff. They write, “Although antispam legislation is
advancing, the spam phenomenon is always one step
ahead, mutating into new forms of annoyance over
mobile communications, instant messaging, Internet
telephony (e.g., VoIP), and spoofing of Internet search
engines.”
The authors provide not only a concise description of
the emerging spam mutants but also a wide-ranging
list of countermeasures that might be deployed to fend
off the pests. Interestingly, the authors conclude their
analysis by noting how difficult the regulation of spam
has proved to be, and in their last line they ask: “Isn’t it
time to rethink our strategy?”
I think this is where we started. 
So in sum, what do we learn from this edition of Cutter
IT Journal? My answer is: “Quite a bit, but not nearly
enough.” Essentially, we provide a brief survey course
outlining the public policy inadequacies we face, the
research inadequacies we face, the inappropriate man-
agerial structures we have to deal with, and the evolu-
tion of mechanisms to undermine our ability to use the
Internet as we desire and, potentially worse, to under-
cut the public’s confidence in it.
The problems we touch on here are daunting, but not
unsolvable. If we can build a personal computer, if
we can figure out how to put one of these miraculous
machines on virtually everyone’s desk, if we can
connect them all worldwide and come up with an
instantaneous and user-friendly system for global
communications — then we can solve these problems.
But we need a lot of new thinking. There is a lot of work
to be done. Be sure to join us in August as we do more of
this new thinking and more hard work on cyber security.
Larry Clinton is the COO of the Internet Security Alliance
(ISAlliance), a leader in advocating market-based systems for improv-
ing information security. In the US Congress, Mr. Clinton served
as cochair of the US congressionally appointed CISWG on market
incentives, which developed recommendations to encourage better cor-
porate security without federal mandates. Mr. Clinton testified before
Congress on this program in April 2005. He also sits on the board
of the National Cyber Security Partnership (NCSP), the Internet
Education Foundation, and the US Congressional Internet Caucus
Advisory Committee, and chairs the NCSP Committee on Incentives
for Improved Corporate Security. In addition to publishing and
testifying on cyber issues, Mr. Clinton has appeared on C-SPAN,
MSNBC, and CNBC to discuss information security. Prior to join-
ing ISAlliance, Mr. Clinton was with the US Telecom Association
(USTA) for 12 years, including the last six as a VP. Before joining
USTA, Mr. Clinton was a Legislative Director in the House of
Representatives and consulted for a variety of industries. 
Mr. Clinton can be reached at ISAlliance, 2500 Wilson Blvd.,
Arlington, VA 22201, USA; E-mail: lclinton@isalliance.org.
UNDERSTANDING THE CYBER THREAT
In today’s world, the traditional security paradigm is
shifting to encompass the unique challenges presented
by the digital landscape. IT and cyber infrastructure are
critical to national economies and homeland security.
Cyber systems support everything from food distribu-
tion to financial transactions to national security. This
reliance on cyber systems extends across the public
sector to the private sector and individual citizens. 
Cyber infrastructure has no boundaries, and threats
often do not conform to traditional models. Because of
increasing dependencies on cyber systems, the conse-
quences of a successful cyber attack on individuals,
businesses, and/or government agencies could be dev-
astating. The US Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) believes that the implementation of a risk man-
agement approach to assess risk, prioritize assets, and
execute protective measures is critical to securing the
nation’s cyber infrastructure.
Individual businesses, the industries they operate in,
and government agencies depend on cyber infrastruc-
ture in different capacities, from reliance on the Internet
to the use of automated digital control systems.1 Most
businesses rely on the Internet and e-mail as a primary
form of communication, while others rely on the
Internet operationally to transact business with cus-
tomers and suppliers, such as taking and placing orders
and/or monitoring inventories. In addition, control sys-
tems are widely used across the private sector to oper-
ate chemical plant processes, refine petroleum products,
produce and distribute electricity, transport oil and gas,
and process food. Government agencies utilize control
systems to treat drinking and waste water, manage
locks and dams, and process mail. 
A cyber attack can launch from anywhere in the world
through the Internet and potentially have mass effect
with little or no warning. Cyber infrastructure is not
limited by geographical, organizational, or political
boundaries, nor is it limited to only one machine, net-
work, or organization. Attack tools and methodologies
are becoming more sophisticated, easier to use, and
widely available from point-and-click Web sites. Five to
10 years ago, these capabilities were resident in only the
most advanced economies. Today, the proliferation of
these sophisticated and readily available tools and
methods places the capability to execute a successful
cyber attack within reach of malicious actors with low
to moderate computer skills and economic resources. 
For example, the Sapphire worm (aka “Slammer”) hit
the cyber infrastructure on 25 January 2003. It exploited
a vulnerability in Microsoft SQL server, multiplied itself
rapidly, and soon spread to networks around the globe.
Within 10 minutes, Sapphire had infected 75,000
machines [3]. The primary impact was network satura-
tion due to bandwidth demands, which caused signifi-
cant disruption to financial institutions (ATMs failed)
and transportation (airline flights were cancelled).
Worldwide, productivity losses cost the public and
private sectors an estimated US $950 million-$1.2 billion
[4]. Although Microsoft created and distributed a patch
to prevent disruptions from the Sapphire worm, it still
had a significant impact because system owners and
operators did not install the patch consistently across
their networks. 
A malicious actor might have numerous motives for
promulgating a cyber attack, including criminal intent
for economic gain or damage, economic or international
espionage, revenge, publicity, and/or a desire to reduce
©2006 Cutter Information LLCCUTTER IT JOURNAL  January 20066
Cyber Risk Management: The Need for Effective Public
and Private Partnership 
by Robert B. Stephan
NIPP IT IN THE BUD
1The draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan defines a control system as “an interconnection of components (designed to maintain
operation of a process or system) connected or related in such a manner as to command, monitor, direct, or regulate itself or another
system.... Examples include the management of the electric power grid using supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tems within the energy sector and process control systems (PCS) that control the timing and volume of chemical processes within the
chemical sector” [6].
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the public’s confidence. Of particular concern is an
attacker’s intent to inflict physical consequences
through a cyber attack (such as an attack on control
systems) or through a combination of cyber and
physical attacks.
Malicious actors that attack cyber infrastructure range
from individual hackers to criminal organizations to
nation states. Some of the most dangerous attackers are
those who are considered insiders to the organization
they are attacking. These insiders have not only autho-
rized access to systems, but also the institutional knowl-
edge of how to be most effective in an attack capacity. In
March 2002, a disgruntled employee who had recently
quit an international financial services company planted
malicious code that deleted 10 billion data files. The
attack affected over 1,300 of the company’s servers in the
US and cost the firm approximately $3 million to repair
the damage and reconstruct the files [5].
The traditional threat model of relying on historical
incidents to predict the likelihood of future attacks
is not as accurate for calculating cyber attacks. In part-
nership with the intelligence community and law
enforcement agencies, DHS is working to more fully
understand the cyber threat both domestically and over-
seas. The department is working to prevent damage
or exploitation, as well as supporting the prosecution
of those malicious actors who attempt to damage or
exploit US cyber infrastructure. As threats continue
to proliferate and mitigation strategies become more
complex, there is increased attention on securing cyber
infrastructure. With a multitude of individuals and
organizations in the public and private sectors striving
to secure the country’s cyber infrastructure, there are
opportunities for coordination and leadership among
the various stakeholders. DHS is leveraging the grow-
ing momentum to help drive public- and private-sector
efforts toward this common goal.
UNDERSTANDING CYBER DEPENDENCIES,
VULNERABILITIES, AND CONSEQUENCES
In addition to understanding the potential threat land-
scape as it applies to cyber infrastructure, it is also
important to examine and understand the realities of
its dependencies and vulnerabilities in anticipating pos-
sible consequences. The responsibilities for cyber secu-
rity cover the entire lifecycle of IT products, including
producers, suppliers, and users. For example, product
developers build security management capabilities into
their products, and all users — including governments,
companies, and individuals, irrespective of their scope
and scale — may select the options that represent their
desired security posture, taking into account risks, vul-
nerabilities, and mitigation costs. While IT industry
security professionals understand their cyber security
responsibilities, much of the broader user community
may not recognize or fulfill their responsibilities. 
A failure in energy, transportation, telecommunications,
or water service can bring an organization’s operations
to a halt. In short order, such a failure can cascade to
other infrastructures, affecting them as much or more.
Physical infrastructure dependencies are known and
accepted because they are prevalent across all businesses
and agencies. While cyber infrastructure dependencies
are an integral part of business operations, they are not
as apparent, and thus are often overlooked or underesti-
mated beyond the IT community. These dependencies
are demonstrated through reliance on the Internet, com-
mercial software, and “trusted connections.”2
In an effort to improve performance, business and gov-
ernment agencies rely on commercial software to stream-
line important business functions. Software supports
many processes, from executing financial transactions,
to storing personal data, to controlling the production of
hazardous chemicals. However, software with unknown
security flaws and software that is not properly patched
can pose serious risks to an organization.
As companies and agencies strive to increase productiv-
ity, revenue, and profit, basic business operations are
being outsourced. From payroll to marketing to man-
aged security services, businesses and governments are
increasing their dependence on other organizations to
perform these basic business functions. This depen-
dence on outsourcing usually relies on cyber infrastruc-
ture to manage data and information and introduces
Insiders have not only authorized access to
systems, but also the institutional knowledge
of how to be most effective in an attack
capacity.
2Trusted connections (i.e., system interconnections) are defined as the direct connection of two or more IT systems owned by separate
organizations [1].
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additional risks to business and government through
trusted connections. Entities may have strong internal
policies and controls in place to secure their cyber
systems, but they cannot ensure the security of cyber
systems and software of their outsourced services [2]. 
IMPLEMENTING A CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT
APPROACH FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION
How can companies, governments, and individuals
work together to address the multitude of cyber threats
and vulnerabilities and demonstrate real progress in
securing our cyber infrastructure? The answer to this
question requires a dynamic risk-based approach that
takes into account the unique consequences, vulnerabili-
ties, and threats of cyberspace. Analyzing risk to man-
age security priorities is one of the DHS’s primary
goals. As DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff noted in a
recent speech, “Risk management must guide our deci-
sion making as we examine how we can best organize
to prevent, respond, and recover from an attack.”3
Consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats are the com-
ponents of risk. While risk assessments should be con-
ducted in all businesses, sectors, and agencies, many
existing risk methodologies have either been limited in
scope (they often do not include cyber assets or cyber
components of physical assets) or not widely imple-
mented. A flexible, widely used risk methodology that
addresses cyber security vulnerability is necessary to
inform the security practices applied to our physical
infrastructure and cyber infrastructure. 
Given today’s highly interconnected environment, a
common approach is required to unify the protective
activities within public, private, and international enti-
ties and secure cyber infrastructure. Such an approach
will allow for risk comparison across assets and more
efficient allocation of resources, as well as efficient pro-
tection of cyber infrastructure. Recognizing this need,
DHS adopted and is promoting a risk-based approach
to protecting critical US infrastructure.
In response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive
7 (HSPD-7), “Critical Infrastructure Identification,
Prioritization, and Protection,” DHS drafted the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), which details how
the public and private sectors will work together to
identify, prioritize, and conduct risk assessments of
the 17 critical infrastructure and key resource (CI/KR)
sectors [6]. DHS’s risk-based approach is described in
detail in the NIPP draft, which provides the unifying
structure for the integration of CI/KR protection efforts
into a single national program. It sets forth a Risk
Management Framework for public- and private-sector
security partners to work together to produce a compre-
hensive, systematic, and rational assessment of national
or sector risk, which drives CI/KR risk reduction activi-
ties. The NIPP includes a cross-sector cyber element that
is a component of each sector and recognizes the IT
Sector specifically as one of the 17 CI/KR sectors.
The cornerstone of the NIPP is the Risk Management
Framework (see Figure 1), which establishes the process
for combining consequence, vulnerability, and threat
information to assess risk. 
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Figure 1 — The NIPP Risk Management Framework.
Entities may have strong internal policies
and controls in place to secure their cyber
systems, but they cannot ensure the security
of cyber systems and software of their
outsourced services.
3Remarks by Secretary Michael Chertoff at the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute on 16 March 2005.
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THE NIPP RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
The NIPP framework is composed of six specific
activities:
1. Set security goals. Define specific outcomes, con-
ditions, end points, or performance targets that
collectively represent an effective security posture.
2. Identify assets. Develop an inventory of the individ-
ual assets and systems that make up the nation’s
CI/KR, some of which may be located outside the
US, and collect information on them, including
dependencies, interdependencies, and reliance on
cyber systems.
3. Assess risks. Determine which assets and systems
are critical by calculating risk, combining potential
direct and indirect consequences of an attack (includ-
ing dependencies and interdependencies associated
with each identified asset), known vulnerabilities
to various potential attack vectors, and general or
specific threat information.
4. Prioritize. Aggregate and order assessment results
to present a comprehensive picture of national CI/KR
risk in order to establish protection priorities and
provide the basis for planning and the informed
allocation of resources.
5. Implement protective programs. Select appropriate
protective measures or programs and allocate fund-
ing and resources designed to address targeted
priorities.
6. Measure effectiveness. Incorporate metrics and other
evaluation procedures at the national and sector lev-
els to measure progress and assess effectiveness of
the national CI/KR protection program.
A common approach is needed to assess risk so that
protection priorities can be set across the CI/KR sectors.
The first step toward achieving this common approach
is to establish common definitions and analysis of the
basic factors of risk: 
1. Consequence analysis
2. Vulnerability assessment
3. Threat analysis 
When the three basic factors of risk (consequence, vul-
nerability, and threat) are combined, they form the risk
associated with an asset, system, or network (i.e., the
potential for loss of or damage to an asset or system).
As risk assessments are completed across assets, sys-
tems, or sets of assets or systems, the results are priori-
tized to help identify where risk reduction activities are
most needed and to determine what protective actions
should be targeted first. 
The highly distributed and interconnected nature of
cyber infrastructure (both physically and logically)
requires that cyber protective actions and programs
be implemented both within and across sectors. DHS
is committed to identifying and supporting a variety
of protective initiatives and fostering international
cooperation to secure the nation’s cyber infrastructure.
As mentioned above, the responsibilities for securing
cyber infrastructure are dispersed and include both the
producers and users of the infrastructure. DHS’s efforts
to implement the NIPP framework recognize that dual-
ity by addressing the IT Sector responsibility and the
cross-sector cyber element that applies to all sectors
under the NIPP. 
IT Sector
The IT Sector, also referred to as the “IT Industrial
Base,” is composed of the producers of hardware, soft-
ware, and IT services. DHS is working collaboratively
with our private- and public-sector partners in the IT
Sector through the IT Sector Coordinating Council and
Government Coordinating Council to determine their
approach and criteria for each step of the framework.
As with all infrastructure sectors, private stakeholder
participation in the process is essential to developing
and implementing an efficient and effective IT Sector-
Specific Plan (SSP). Furthermore, the Internet has been
identified as a key resource, as all sectors rely upon
and utilize the Internet to varying degrees. It is made
up of assets from both the IT and Telecommunications
Sectors, and the availability of the service is the respon-
sibility of these two sectors.
Cross-Sector Cyber Element
While the producers of cyber infrastructure are
addressed in the IT Sector, the cross-sector cyber ele-
ment of the NIPP focuses on consumers of cyber infra-
structure, including CI/KR sectors and their associated
security partners. Each sector is responsible for securing
its cyber infrastructure. The NIPP draft addresses cyber
security and the cross-sector cyber element of CI/KR
protection across all 17 sectors. The NIPP also addresses
specific cyber responsibilities for sector security part-
ners, processes, and initiatives to reduce cyber risk, and
provides milestones and metrics to measure progress on
enhancing the nation’s protection of its cyber infrastruc-
ture. The 17 CI/KR SSPs will further detail risk reduc-
tion strategies related to their respective critical cyber
infrastructure.
©2006 Cutter Information LLCCUTTER IT JOURNAL  January 200610
CONCLUSION
All public- and private-sector organizations should
develop and implement a cyber risk management strat-
egy to reduce the risk to the nation’s cyber infrastruc-
ture. This strategy should include the following three
components:
1. Identify cyber assets, systems, and networks. A
process should be defined and implemented to iden-
tify cyber assets and cyber elements of physical assets
of potential sector, regional, or national importance.
Cyber assets represent a variety of hardware and soft-
ware components, including business and control
systems, networking equipment, database servers
and software, and security systems. The process for
identifying cyber assets should be scalable, distrib-
utable, and repeatable to ensure that it is practical
and efficient and provides accurate results.
2. Assess cyber risk. Consequences, vulnerabilities, and
threats should be identified and analyzed to assess
risk. Potential consequences should include those that
result from reliance on cyber assets. Vulnerability
assessments can be conducted on cyber assets using
a variety of approaches, methodologies, or criteria.
Threat analysis should address those scenarios that
are of highest concern.
3. Implement protective programs to reduce risk.
Organizations should make decisions to implement
protective programs based on their risk assessments
and their desired security posture. While some risk
may be acceptable, appropriate and effective protec-
tive measures will be necessary to balance risk and
associated costs.
An organization’s cyber risk mitigation strategy should
be realistic and actionable, with stakeholders fully
engaged in the implementation. The NIPP framework
is flexible enough to allow individual organizations to
tailor it to meet their requirements. By securing portions
of our cyber infrastructure across multiple organizations
and the 17 sectors, the overall infrastructure will
become more resilient.
No one can protect the entire cyber infrastructure alone.
DHS will continue to partner with state, territorial,
tribal, local, and international governments, businesses,
industries, and sectors to mitigate the risk associated
with cyber consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats.
DHS applauds the efforts of businesses and government
agencies thus far and encourages them to continue part-
nering with their Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) and
respective coordinating councils. Together, all infra-
structure stakeholders can reduce risk and improve the
overall security of the national cyber infrastructure. 
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RISKS AND CONSEQUENCES
According to the recent Technology Assessment: Cyber
Security for Critical Infrastructure Protection conducted
by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO):
Since the early 1990s, increasing computer interconnectivity
— most notably growth in the use of the Internet — has revo-
lutionized the way that our government, our nation, and
much of the world communicate and conduct business. While
the benefits have been enormous, this widespread intercon-
nectivity also poses significant risks to the government’s and
our nation’s computer systems and, more important, to the
critical operations and infrastructures they support. The
speed and accessibility that create the enormous benefits of
the computer age, if not properly controlled, allow unautho-
rized individuals and organizations to inexpensively eaves-
drop on or interfere with these operations from remote
locations, for mischievous or malicious purposes including
fraud or sabotage. [37]
While security analysts understand a system’s vulnera-
bility to potential cyber attacks fairly well, the conse-
quences of such attacks to companies, business sectors,
and nations are largely unknown. To date, research on
the economic consequences of cyber attacks has been
limited, dealing primarily with microanalyses of the
direct impacts of attacks on a particular organization.
Many organizations recognize the significant potential
of a cyber attack’s effects to cascade from one computer
or business system to another, but there have been no
significant efforts to develop a methodology to account
for both direct and indirect costs. Without such a
methodology, governments and businesses are hard-
pressed to make informed decisions about how much
to invest in cyber security and how to invest each dollar
most effectively.
Such investment decisions require the answer to at least
two questions: (1) What is the likelihood of an attack?;
and (2) What are the likely consequences of an attack? In
this article, we explore some answers to these questions.
We begin by addressing the data available to inform
decisions about cyber security investment. Next, we look
at what research tells us about the tradeoffs between
investment and protection. We end with a discussion of
where research is headed and what help businesses can
expect in the short and long term from these research
results.
DATA REALITIES
Many organizations assume that the likelihood of a
cyber attack is reasonably high and may increase over
time. Anecdotal evidence suggests that even among the
many organizations that have taken steps to detect and
prevent attacks, some have experienced significant inci-
dents nevertheless. To provide a more realistic picture
of the nature and number of cyber incidents, several
surveys have been conducted in the last few years to
capture information about security attacks and protec-
tion. The following are among the most well known:
 First conducted in 2002, the annual Australian
Computer Crime and Security Survey (ACC)1 is
based on information provided by Australia’s federal,
state, and territorial law enforcement agencies and
AusCERT.2 It solicits data from large organizations
about computer network attacks and computer mis-
use trends in Australia. 
 The UK Department of Trade and Industry has
administered seven Information and Security
Breaches Surveys (ISBS)3 since 1991. They report on
Internet use, dependence on information technology,
and computer security incidents at UK businesses.
 The annual CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security
Survey4 polls computer security practitioners in US
corporations, government agencies, financial institu-
tions, medical institutions, and universities that have
joined the Computer Security Institute (CSI) or have
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SURVEY SAYS ...
1See www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=2001.
2See www.auscert.org.au.
3See www.infosec.co.uk/files/DTI_Survey_Report.pdf.
4See www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/FBI2005.pdf.
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attended a CSI seminar or workshop. The survey
addresses computer usage, attacks, and actions taken
in response to security incidents.
In addition, there are global surveys within particular
sectors, such as the Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Global
Security Survey (GSS).5 The third GSS, administered in
2005, solicited input from chief security officers and
security management teams of financial services indus-
try organizations worldwide, asking their perceptions of
how one organization’s information security compares
to its counterparts’ security.
These surveys paint a mixed picture of the security
landscape. The ACC reports a decrease in attacks of all
types. On the other hand, the ISBS survey found that
the percentage of UK businesses experiencing attacks
has increased by one-third over the last two years, and
43% of the CSI member organizations surveyed have
experienced increases in the rate of attacks from 2003
to 2004. At the same time, the Deloitte survey found
that the rate of financial sector security breaches in the
US has remained roughly the same for the past year.
The variation in these reports may derive from the dif-
ferent populations being surveyed; the surveys repre-
sent different countries, different sectors, different
degrees of sophistication about security matters, and
bias in the pool of respondents. Moreover, most are con-
venience surveys, so the population represented by the
respondents is unclear, making it difficult to generalize
the results. 
Another significant problem is the lack of standards
in defining, tracking, and reporting security incidents
and attacks. Surveys ask variously about the incidence
of “electronic attacks” (ACC); “virus encounters”
and “virus disasters” (the ICSA Labs Eighth Annual
Computer Virus Prevalence Survey);6 “total number
of electronic crimes or network, system, or data intru-
sions” (CSI/FBI); “security incidents,” “accidental secu-
rity incidents,” “malicious security incidents,” and
“serious security incidents” (ISBS); “any form of secu-
rity breach” (GSS); “unauthorized use of computer
systems” (CSI/FBI); and “incidents that resulted in an
unexpected or unscheduled outage of critical business
systems” (Ernst & Young Global Information Security
Survey [EY]).7 It would be difficult to find two surveys
whose results are strictly comparable. Thus, much of the
reported evidence is categorized differently from one
study to another, and the answers are based on respon-
dents’ opinions, interpretations, or perceptions, not on
consistent capture and analysis of solid empirical data. 
Understanding the sources of attacks is similarly prob-
lematic. For example, the ACC survey reports that the
rate of insider attacks has remained constant. However,
Deloitte claims that, in financial services, the majority of
attacks come from the inside, and the rate is rising. The
EY survey emphasizes the rising threat of insider attacks
as well. Several other surveys note that sources of attacks
are unknown in a significant percentage of cases. 
Across surveys, there is general agreement about which
attacks are most serious. Viruses, Trojan horses, worms,
and malicious code pose significant threats; most sectors
also fear insider misuse and abuse of access. Phishing8 is
a relatively new and growing concern, and such attacks
have increased dramatically over the past two years. 
In addition to number and kind of attack, surveys often
ask about effect, particularly in terms of cost. Significant
variations exist in this category as well. For example,
the ICSA survey reports a sharp (25%) increase in the
cost of recovering lost or damaged data. However, the
ACC, EY, and CSI/FBI surveys find a decrease in total
damage from attacks, even though this cost is increasing
for some kinds of attacks (such as unauthorized access
and theft, noted by CSI/FBI). Twenty-five percent
of responding organizations report financial loss to
CSI/FBI, and 56% report operational losses. 
Once again, the reasons for these variations are partly
attributable to disparities in the pools of respondents.
However, a more significant problem, acknowledged
both by survey respondents and administrators, is the
difficulty in detecting and measuring both direct and
indirect costs from security breaches. There are neither
accepted definitions of loss nor standard, reliable
methods to measure it. For example, the ICSA 2004 sur-
vey notes that “respondents in our survey historically
underestimate costs by a factor of 7 to 10.”
5See www.deloitte.pt/dtt/research/0,1015,sid%253D1000%2526cid%253D85452,00.html.
6ICSA Labs, a division of TruSecure Corporation, has administered a survey about viruses since 1994. More information is available at
www3.ca.com/Solutions/Collateral.asp?CID=41607&ID=156.
7See www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/Austria/2004_global_info_sec_survey/$file/2004_Global_Information_Security_Survey_2004.pdf.
8Phishing is the practice of directing Internet users to a fake Web site by using authentic-looking e-mail in an attempt to steal passwords,
financial, or personal information, or to introduce malicious code.
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There are several areas in which the various surveys do,
in fact, reach consensus. For example, many surveys
indicate that formal security policies and incident
response plans are important. In addition, lack of edu-
cation and training of staff, both within the IT security
team and throughout the organization, appears to be
a major obstacle to improved security. More generally,
a poor “security culture” (in terms of awareness and
understanding of security issues and policies) is often
reported to be a problem. Thus, survey respondents
report that regular testing and updating of security
procedures, combined with practices that increase staff
awareness, are very important. Unfortunately, there is
very little quantitative evidence supporting these views,
plausible as they may be. 
The various survey results highlight another gap in our
understanding of security investments. It is unclear how
much organizations have invested in security protec-
tion, prevention, and mitigation; in addition, we do not
know how they make investment decisions or measure
the effectiveness of their security investments. Inputs
required for such decision making — such as rates
and severity of attacks, cost of damage and recovery
throughout the enterprise, and actual cost of security
measures of all types — are not known with any accu-
racy. Neither is it clear whether traditional measures,
such as return on investment or internal rate of return,
are the best ones to use in assessing security effective-
ness. Simple questions, such as how much more secu-
rity an extra dollar buys a company, go unanswered.
To address this situation, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
at the US Department of Justice will soon administer the
first large-scale, carefully designed and sampled cyber
security survey. It will provide the first official US statis-
tics on the extent and consequences of cyber crime
against US businesses. Planned for early 2006, the results
should be publicly available by the end of the year.
DATA NEEDS
To understand how to improve decision making about
the economics of cyber security, we must first examine
what data is needed and how it could be used. Ideally, a
data source should provide information to support the
following tasks.
Managing Resources to Monitor and Address
Cyber Incidents 
Survey data can inform resource allocation decisions
ranging from government resources for monitoring
cyber crime to industrial resources for sensing attempts
at system penetration. Trend data about cyber incidents,
including records from incident response teams, can
support more effective strategic planning. Such data
can then be used to help in:
 Understanding current best practices
 Evaluating existing regulations and standards and
formulating new ones 
 Choosing the most effective measures of effectiveness
for resource allocation
 Choosing organizational structures to facilitate
efficient use of resources
 Understanding current and future trends: types
and frequency of attack, probable and possible
consequences for each type of attack, targeted sectors
and businesses, and motives for and intended conse-
quences of attacks
Implementing Standards and Guidelines
Trend data about vulnerabilities and attacks can suggest
areas that new or updated standards and guidelines
might address. For example, the Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVE)9 list uses standardized names for
vulnerabilities, which allows them to be cross-referenced
and catalogued. The application of such standards allows
organizations to search for common problems and possi-
ble solutions. In turn, standard classification and naming
of vulnerabilities, types of attack, and techniques used in
attacks can permit analysis that suggests best practices
involving the most cost-effective technologies, policies
and procedures, and organizational structures and
processes.
Involving the Insurance Industry
The insurance industry may play a growing role in
securing cyberspace. For example, the Basel II agree-
ment10 allows businesses to decrease their financial
reserves in exchange for sharing information about
9See http://cve.mitre.org. To date, 115 organizations from industry, government, and academia worldwide have declared that 186
network security products or services are or will be CVE-compatible.
10The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a group of central bankers and banking regulators, proposed a new international capital
standard, published in June 2004. The proposal, known as Basel II, will be implemented from year-end 2006. Basel II is a comprehen-
sive framework for regulatory capital and risk management. It represents a major revision of the international standard on bank capital
adequacy that was introduced in 1988, aligning the capital measurement framework with sound contemporary practices in banking,
improvements in risk management, and enhanced financial stability.
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cyber vulnerabilities and agreeing to comply with
minimum standards. Credible survey data could be
used to set policy terms and standards for insurability
against cyber attacks.
Benchmarking Infrastructure Protection Efforts
Much of every nation’s critical infrastructure depends
heavily on information technology. Repeated and coor-
dinated surveys could be used to compare the cyber
security postures of different parts of the infrastruc-
ture and to measure the rate of improvement. Survey
respondents could use the results to benchmark their
own efforts.11 In addition, benchmarks support:
 Analysis of trends in the frequency and, especially,
severity of attacks and consequent losses
 Determination of best practices for addressing current
and changing vulnerabilities
 Regular updating of standards
Benchmarking Government Systems
Repeated surveys could help benchmark government
performance compared with the private sector. For
example, data might show whether private-sector orga-
nizations are being attacked more or less than public-
sector organizations and whether the private or public
sector is more successful in defending against attacks. 
Suggesting or Enforcing International Agreements
Survey data can support law enforcement officials in
negotiating agreements about cyber crime. For example,
data about the origins and nature of cyber incidents,
particularly their strategic and financial impacts, could
help identify where agreements are needed. Surveys
could capture data regarding:
 Sources and targets identified by location
 Vulnerabilities requiring international agreement
and enforcement
Measuring Effectiveness
Government plays a role in educating and encouraging
both businesses and citizens to strengthen cyber secu-
rity. Trends from the survey data could provide feed-
back on the effectiveness of such campaigns. Also,
survey information on which types of businesses
are using which types of prevention and mitigation
strategies can highlight the most effective techniques,
supporting decision making about research and financial
investment. In turn, these types of data can influence:
 The perception and empirical measurement of
effectiveness of security strategies of all types
 Development and dissemination of good metrics
 The perceived and actual effects of regulations and
standards, and enforcement thereof
 The perceived and actual effect of both public- and
private-sector education strategies 
RESEARCH NEEDS AND RESEARCH REALITIES
To make effective decisions about economic investment
in cyber security, we need more than data; we also need
research into motivation, action, and relationships. By
its nature, this research must be multidisciplinary, and
it is often conducted within and across the boundaries
of engineering, business, and arts and science schools.
Historically, cyber security has been the domain of engi-
neers. However, social scientists have recently brought
new insight to the problem, with strong arguments
for richer economic analysis. For example, University
of Cambridge researcher Ross Anderson makes the
case that studying economic incentives is as important
as studying the underlying technology [3]. Other
researchers argue that cyber security is a core business
concern [31] and that market incentives are fundamen-
tal to shaping relevant public policy [1].
But the literature is immature, as both the paucity of
empirical analysis and the lack of agreement on find-
ings reveal. Nevertheless, researchers bring economics
to bear in four related streams of inquiry: 
1. Software quality. What forces create vulnerable
software and systems?
2. Market interventions. Which market-based and
regulatory interventions are designed to spread risk,
diminish information asymmetry, and better align
stakeholder incentives?
3. Enterprise decision making. What are the various
approaches to investing in cyber security?
4. Evaluation. How useful are different evaluative
techniques and criteria?
We will discuss each of these in turn. 
11The RAND Corporation has performed similar activities; see information about European security information-sharing initiatives at
www.iaac.org.uk.
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Software Quality
Software is generally held to be a complex product
likely to have defects that create vulnerability to attack.
Recently, researchers have begun to examine the contex-
tual factors — such as time to market and shareholder
value — that lead software vendors to invest (or under-
invest) in quality. 
 Patches. Some researchers have demonstrated ven-
dors’ incentives to release products early and make
repairs later using patches [4]. Other research suggests
that it is socially beneficial to release fixes quickly [36]. 
 Disclosure timing. Questions remain about when
and whether vendors should disclose newfound vul-
nerabilities. Researchers are at odds about the details
of specifying the vulnerabilities in a formal model
[5, 10]. 
 Stock-price effects. Given the corporate mandate to
create shareholder value, researchers are looking to
the stock market for insight on vendor behavior. The
results are mixed. For example, Katherine Campbell
and her colleagues at the University of Maryland
found limited evidence of a negative market reaction
to public announcements of security breaches [9]. By
contrast, Carnegie Mellon researchers describe the neg-
ative change in market valuation that results immedi-
ately after disclosure of a software failure [35]. 
 Vulnerability reduction. Researchers have also ques-
tioned the value of actively searching for vulnerabili-
ties. Again, the results are mixed. Andy Ozment, a
student of Ross Anderson’s, drew no clear conclusion
from the data [27], and Eric Rescorla, founder of
RTFM, Inc., found no relationship between software
quality and the effort to remove vulnerabilities [28].
Market Interventions
Researchers are formally examining the impact of
information sharing, market mechanisms, and new
approaches to insurance and liability to assess their
effectiveness. The effects of these approaches are as
yet inconclusive.
Information-Sharing Programs
In connection with work on software quality,
researchers are examining the economic consequences
of and motivations for sharing security information.
Bruce Schneier, a frequent commentator on security
issues, looks at full disclosure in the context of
“inevitable vulnerability” and proposes efforts to
shrink the window of exposure by prompting vendors
to act quickly [32]. By drawing on the literature of trade
associations and research joint ventures, Lawrence
Gordon and his colleagues at the University of
Maryland illustrate a theoretical approach to analyzing
the voluntary Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
(ISACs) formed by business sectors to advise the US
government about homeland security issues [21]. The
University of Pittsburgh’s Esther Gal-Or and Carnegie
Mellon’s Anindya Ghose go a step further, using a for-
mal model of ISACs to show that security investments
strategically complement information sharing [16].
These results provide a context for understanding when
ISACs can be effective. Overall, researchers have found
that information-sharing programs can have a signifi-
cant and positive effect on security.
Market Mechanisms
Anderson draws parallels between cyber security and
environmental pollution; both involve investment by
one group that benefits another, a phenomenon that
is called a “negative externality” [2]. For this reason,
researchers have proposed creating “vulnerability mar-
kets” using transferable security credits, so that more
vulnerabilities in one product can balance fewer in
other products (much as the market in pollution credits
works in the US today) [7, 8]. Stuart Schechter of MIT
Lincoln Laboratory proposes using vulnerability mar-
kets to benchmark security strength by rewarding bug
discoveries [29]. He argues that such a market will yield
information that can be used to improve the software
development process.
Ozment questions this proposal by comparing the
mechanism to auctions and pointing out their inherent
limitations [26]. Purdue University’s Karthik Kannan
and Carnegie Mellon’s Rahul Telang also reject market-
based mechanisms because of higher expected user
losses than passive systems (such as Computer
Emergency Response Teams) and — even worse —
incentives for misuse by monopolists of an application
or operating system [23]. 
Researchers have begun to examine the
contextual factors — such as time to market
and shareholder value — that lead software
vendors to invest (or underinvest) in quality.
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Liability Reform 
Some researchers recommend stricter liability require-
ments for software companies, ending the use of 
end-user license agreements that obviate vendor
responsibility. For example, Schneier makes the case
for tightening liability on software manufacturers [31],
while Informed Security founder Adam Shostack calls
for more subtle use of vendor liability requirements to
create better signaling of product quality [33]. 
Research has also examined the benefits of shifting lia-
bility through insurance contracts. Jay Kesan and his
colleagues at the University of Illinois’ Information
Trust Institute explain the limitations of traditional
insurance when applied to cyber security, citing a lack
of good data, overpricing, and excessive exclusions to
skirt moral hazard risks [24]. Further research has iden-
tified additional challenges to a healthy insurance mar-
ket in the form of interdependent risk, which decreases
the benefit of risk diversification. This condition results
from widespread incentives to undersecure and the
prevalence of dominant software packages, where a
single exploitation can affect a large population of
systems [6, 25].
Enterprise Decision Making
Companies face tough decisions about cyber security
investments. Recognizing that most information infra-
structure is controlled by wide-ranging corporations,
economic research has provided tools — ranging from
accepted methods instantiated in accessible tools to
esoteric methods not yet widely available — to support
analysis of corporate investment in cyber security.
Gordon and his University of Maryland colleagues pro-
vide a useful framework to help companies think about
tradeoffs between investing indirectly in cyber insur-
ance and directly in security countermeasures [22].
Furthermore, Gordon and coauthor Martin Loeb offer a
systematic way to incorporate qualitative information
into the investment analysis through a prioritizing
approach called the Analytical Hierarchy Process to
elicit user preferences [18], and their book explains
how to perform return-on-investment calculations [19].
Similarly, James Conrad, a doctoral student at the
University of Idaho, proposes using Monte-Carlo
simulation to support midlevel managers in forecasting
uncertainties in security investment decisions [12]. 
On the other hand, Stanford’s Kevin Soo Hoo [34] and
Fariborz Farahmand and his colleagues at Purdue [15]
suggest more expansive frameworks using formal deci-
sion analysis to determine the amount to invest based
on the likelihood of intrusion estimation. And Tulane’s
Huseyin Cavusoglu and his coauthors provide a
detailed model to help companies select the best secu-
rity architecture based on observed intrusions and
derived likelihood of attack [11].
Evaluation
Consensus is yet to form on which evaluative criteria
are most useful. Researchers and practitioners have
looked to the literature on investment analysis in
general and security investment in particular for guid-
ance on how to make investment decisions in cyber
security. Unfortunately, no method has emerged as a
“gold standard” in theory or practice. Initial calls to dis-
card the heuristic of fear-uncertainty-and-doubt were
replaced by insistence on return on security investment
(ROSI) analysis [17]. However, ROSI is itself highly
contentious. Although consistent with other corporate
investment decisions, ROSI and related concepts of
internal rate of return and net present value are consid-
ered to be inappropriate frameworks for this kind of
analysis. Gordon and Loeb contend that ROSI does
not reveal the true economic rate of return and leads
to the wrong investment objectives [20]. Furthermore,
Cavusoglu et al. suggest that ROSI is frustrated by the
need to assign costs to poorly defined outcomes [11]. 
Researchers are now proposing new metrics to address
the challenges of cost assignment and to gain more use-
ful insight into the problem. For example, Farahmand et
al. consider using damage assessment across predefined
categories as an evaluative framework [14]. Schechter
[30] introduces cost-to-break (i.e., the effort required to
invade a system) as a measure of security strength [29].
The twin metrics of cost-to-break and security strength
work within an evaluative model that considers the
effort required by an attacker to gain access to a system.
Schechter offers this measure to improve predictions
about the amount of risk faced by a system. The
University of Milan’s Marco Cremonini and Zucchetti
Group’s Patrizia Martini take a similar approach in
Researchers are now proposing new metrics
to address the challenges of cost assignment
and to gain more useful insight into the
problem. 
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channeling the perspective of the attacker. They use
this vantage point to measure impacts and thereby
benchmark appropriate levels of investment based
on an attacker’s potential “return-on-attack” [13]. 
THE WAY FORWARD
The economics of cyber security is an emerging field.
The first Workshop on the Economics of Information Security
was held in Berkeley, California, USA, in 2002, and IEEE
Security & Privacy devoted a special issue to the topic in
January 2005.12 Both the public and private sectors are
eager for better data, better understanding, and better
methods for using resources wisely in protecting critical
products and services and providing assurance that soft-
ware will work as expected. We suggest that the most
effective way forward involves three steps:
1. Continued interdisciplinary research into the
motivations, methods, and opportunities for wisely
investing in cyber security
2. Active participation and cooperation by government,
industry, and academia, including involvement in
high-quality surveys and analysis
3. Sharing of information about cyber security incidents,
using vehicles that protect consumers, corporations,
and markets but enhance our understanding of the
nature, volume, and cost of attacks
In particular, Cutter IT Journal readers can keep abreast
of cyber security economics issues by participating in
the Fifth Annual Workshop on the Economics of Information
Security in Cambridge, UK,13 by participating in surveys
and studies to better understand the nature and extent
of cyber incidents, by sharing information with
researchers and colleagues to enable business sectors to
take a coordinated approach to preventing and mitigat-
ing attacks, and by applying appropriate business meas-
ures to balance security investments with other requests
for corporate resources. We can all be active players in
improving our understanding of cyber security econom-
ics by monitoring cyber incidents and responses, solicit-
ing and using standard terminology and measures, and
by sharing data whenever possible.
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INTRODUCTION
Great authorization and authentication will not save
a system from a poorly planned implementation and
sustainment. Shepherding a software-intensive system
through project development to implementation is just
the beginning of the saga. Modern software-intensive
systems face the confusing and multifaceted challenge
of sustainment. After implementation is when the secu-
rity problems will show up. The developers move on,
and the operational and sustainment support staff do
the best they can.
As today’s systems become increasingly reliant on
COTS software, the issues surrounding sustainment
become even more complex. The risks of ignoring these
issues can potentially undermine not only security but
also the stability, usability, and longevity of systems in
the field. Organizations use COTS products as system
components because they believe that commercial prod-
ucts are mature, stable, and adhere to well-recognized
industry standards — and will thus yield robust, main-
tainable systems. This is a myth. The reality indicates
more of a Rube Goldberg mix of “glue code” that links
the pieces and parts into a “working” structure. To
make matters worse, change is a constant requirement,
as each vendor provides regular updates on an individ-
ualized schedule, and these updates must be applied
within a prescribed time frame. Vendors also release
emergency updates in response to identified security
threats. Failure to apply the updates may result in
security exposure as well as the loss of maintenance
support, but applying them may require a complete
restructuring of the system to return the pieces to a
working whole. The result is a system in constant
change. Poorly managed change further increases
opportunity for security problems.
The growing popularity of service-based architectures
and the use of common services shared across many
systems linked in system-of-systems environments
further challenge sustainment capabilities. While this
architecture approach provides greater flexibility in
design and development, extensive use of common
services forces greater responsibility on sustainment
functions for ensuring security. Shared common
services must function as stable, well-established com-
munication mechanisms. In order to maintain these
common services as technology and system require-
ments change, version control and backward compat-
ibility for software upgrades become critical needs.
Common services can become excellent conduits for
security compromise throughout an infrastructure. In
many cases, the common services are the security con-
trols for the infrastructure, handling authentication and
authorization functions. Sustainment of these services
requires careful planning and control.
Systems cannot be constructed to eliminate security risk,
which is an ever-changing challenge. However, systems
can be built incorporating mechanisms that assist with
— instead of ignoring — the need to recognize, resist,
and recover from security problems when they do occur.
Decisions by the system owner on things such as licens-
ing, ongoing product and user support, infrastructure
upgrades, and hardware standards contribute to secu-
rity risk in sustainment efforts. These may disagree with
operational management decisions on intrusion detec-
tion, firewall restrictions, hardware support, and soft-
ware patch management. This article discusses the
linkages between development and sustainment that
impact security and offers an approach that can enhance
planning for security during implementation and sus-
tainment. It also includes lessons learned from applying
the planning approach in practice. 
WHAT IS SOFTWARE SUSTAINMENT?
Until recently, software maintenance was considered
sufficient long-term support for an implemented sys-
tem, but not anymore. The IEEE Standard Glossary of
Software Engineering Terminology defines “software
maintenance” as:
The process of modifying a software system or component
after delivery to correct faults, improve performance or other
attributes, or adapt to a changed environment. [2]
However, this definition ignores a broad range of
efforts that must be addressed to keep a fielded system
fully functional, including configuration management,
help-desk support, user and support staff training,
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COTS product management, documentation manage-
ment, and technology refresh. Too frequently, these crit-
ical operational areas are hidden and poorly planned,
which results in underfunding and limitations for sup-
port resources. Software sustainment requires address-
ing the processes, procedures, people, material, and
information required to support, maintain, and operate
all software aspects of a system.
Industry sources have asserted that the typical IT organi-
zation spends 20% of its IT dollars on developing new
capability and 80% on maintaining and operating the
existing infrastructure [1]. However, it appears the orga-
nizational planning is focused completely on the initial
20% while the rest of the activities are expected to transi-
tion smoothly into the ongoing operation with minimal
effort. This delay strategy is supported by the prevailing
ROI financial perspective, which views dollars to be
spent some time in the future as of lower value [3] and,
hence, of lesser concern. In reality, decisions made today
frame the options that will or will not be available in the
future. Also, the separation of development resources
from the operational support responsibilities, while use-
ful for effective management control, minimizes the level
of operational knowledge readily available to developers. 
An organization’s ability to sustain a system is greatly
influenced by the decisions made during the design,
development, and deployment of a system and its compo-
nents. In addition, existing operations standards and pro-
cedures, developed based on experience with previously
fielded systems, cannot be applied unilaterally to every
system under development. Many systems, especially
modernization and reengineering efforts, change the
way the organization is using (and abusing) technology. 
WHY SHOULD OPERATIONS CARE ABOUT SECURITY
FOR SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPMENT?
Each system implementation represents a security risk
to the operational environment, which is where security
problems will appear. The transition to operations
(T2O) should be a partnership planned well in advance
by a team with representatives from development, the
user community, and operational support. This team
must compare the needs of the new system to the cur-
rent environment to identify critical gaps and options
for closing them. Too frequently, installation appears
more like a race to a finish line once the system has
completed integration testing. T2O planning should
include a security risk assessment and a vulnerability
assessment as part of the standard process. In addition,
both of these types of assessment should be scheduled
periodically throughout the life of the fielded system. 
Planning is particularly critical if the sustainment effort
is handled through a contract with a support organiza-
tion. The contract may already be in place when a new
system is ready for implementation. To be effective,
the sustainment effort must provide mechanisms for
assembling all the details of support, including security,
needed for each system. Training for sustainment per-
sonnel should be considered, and, at a minimum, accu-
rate functional and technical documentation is needed.
Funding for both of these activities must be provided as
part of the implementation planning.
Those tasked with handling sustainment and opera-
tions support, which may be two separate groups, must
understand the physical components of the system and
determine if there are unique characteristics that may
change the current infrastructure footprint. In addition,
those supporting the fielded system must develop an
appreciation for the critical business processes the sys-
tem supports and the organizational dependencies on
availability and recovery options. These may not fit
neatly into how the current production support envi-
ronment is functioning, and adjustments to the infra-
structure must be planned.
THE SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT
Security risk assessments should be performed during
development to prepare for implementation and period-
ically throughout the life of a fielded system. The secu-
rity risk assessment should include the following steps:
 Define the target system implementation.
 Determine security attributes.
 Identify threats.
 Identify risks.
 Develop a protection plan to address operational gaps.
In defining the target system, each specific component
of the operational system must be clearly described.
This description includes the hardware and software
composition; the data stored, processed, and transmit-
ted by each component; and where each component will
live in the current infrastructure. The description should
include planned security controls such as certificates,
encryption, intrusion detection, transaction logging,
and any other means of allowing each component to
recognize, resist, and recover from a compromise.
Determining the system’s security attributes enables
the organization to identify what is important about the
processes and critical information on the target system
that requires security protection. The attributes describe
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the confidentiality, integrity, and availability require-
ments expected for the system.
Threat identification describes ways in which the system
would likely be targeted for compromise. Accidental
problems will occur, resulting in expected system actions
with content mistakes and unexpected sequences. In
addition, attackers will be attempting to create unex-
pected situations deliberately devised to subvert the
system, with unusual sequences of actions and content
designed to trigger compromising results. The attacker
can be a user or an external source. These scenarios, often
referred to as abuse cases, may be considered in system
design when architecture and interface design selections
are made. However, as operational experience with the
system increases, the understanding of threats improves,
and the system security as implemented is usually no
longer adequate. Additional threats include limitations
in current organizational policies and practices as well
as third-party arrangements and outsourcing exposure.
For a threat to become a risk, there must be an organi-
zational impact should the threat be realized, such as
lost revenue, fines, or lost productivity. Identifying risk
involves assigning the level of impact to each threat
identified for the system. The potential increase of
impact for cascading threats should also be evaluated.
The team performing the security risk assessment
will develop a protection plan to address risks that
the organization cannot ignore. This plan can include
policy changes, operational changes, system develop-
ment changes, restrictions on acceptable technology use,
monitoring requirements, or any other effort that will
establish a way to recognize, resist, and recover from
a high-impact situation. Part of this planning process
must include assigning responsibility for each activity
and establishing a tracking process as part of the system
implementation to make sure protection mechanisms
are in place before the system is put into operation. 
UNIQUE SUSTAINMENT CHALLENGES 
FOR COTS COMPONENTS
Vendor licensing management and support must be con-
sistent with the planned rollout and ongoing needs of the
system users. The development effort frequently uses a
limited license set, and full production licensing needs
are delayed to defer the cost outlay. If implementation
planning has not included vendor licensing negotiations,
there may be some last-minute surprises in the operating
costs of the system. For security, maintenance support is
a critical component of the vendor license. Patches for
security vulnerabilities are distributed as part of the
maintenance support. The termination of support for a
product that is still fielded can leave the infrastructure
vulnerable to subsequent security problems linked to that
software or hardware component.
Someone has to be responsible for keeping a sufficient
number of licenses current. If licensing management is
already assigned within the organization, coordination
with additional vendors may not require significant
added effort. If this is not the case, a mechanism for
tracking where licenses are deployed (which can be as
simple as a spreadsheet of usage information) must be
established and maintained as updated versions are
fielded.
Vendor management for fielded systems can become
a major security issue if the lines of communication
between the organization and the vendor are unclear.
What kind of vendor support will be available? How
will vendor upgrades be handled? Will documents,
files, or e-mail notifications be sent to an assigned indi-
vidual, or will someone need to check the vendor’s
Web site for posted changes? Large organizations with
a wide range of fielded COTS products may have stan-
dard procedures for handling these issues, and the
acquisition process should include negotiation with the
vendor to follow these. If COTS products are relatively
limited in the operational environment, vendor manage-
ment functions may need to be established. 
Will each vendor upgrade require development support
to ensure the components of the system continue to
work together? Will the sustainment organization have
sufficient capability to perform this testing, and who
will handle problems if something does not check out?
The necessary resources must be planned and allocated
in advance to allow for effective security management.
Delays in applying vendor patches to installed products
represent security vulnerabilities to an organization’s
technology infrastructure, but patches can break sys-
tems. Organizations must establish mechanisms for
addressing these issues in advance. 
WHEN DOES A SYSTEM TRANSITION TO SUSTAINMENT?
A fielded system is not necessarily ready for sustain-
ment. Pilot test sites may run for a long time as
functionality is finalized and prepared for broader
organizational use. However, operational control
should begin as soon as the system enters the orga-
nizational infrastructure. Operational control of the
physical boxes and the software running on them to
ensure appropriate hardening is critical. Unprotected
machines and software can be compromised in minutes.
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Separation of the operational environment from the
development and testing space may not be clearly
defined for systems in transition. This can quickly
become an area of high security risk. Developers build-
ing the systems should not have uncontrolled access to
the production environment. Organizational policies
and procedures are needed to ensure an appropriate
level of protection for the information assets. 
A FEW ADDITIONAL THINGS TO CONSIDER
If sustainment and operational support are outsourced,
will security management be handled based on your
organizational requirements, or will you have to adhere
to the standard operating procedures of the sustainment
organization? Will the level of security control the out-
sourcer provides be sufficient for the information assets
you need to protect? What restrictions are in place to
control subcontracting? Will the contracted resources be
prepared to proactively address software fixes, vendor
patches, and technology upgrades, or is the system only
changed when something breaks? All of these issues
must be addressed during the contracting process.
SOME LESSONS LEARNED
Sustainment organizations are not well versed in secu-
rity and reliability of software and systems. Traditionally
their focus has been on configuration management of
systems with a very stable software base, and compo-
nent failure involved the replacement of hardware parts.
Sustainment organizations typically provide software
upgrades once a year. This may be sufficient if there is a
mechanism for critical security patches to be deployed in
a timely fashion. Adjustments to this upgrade cycle will
incur additional support costs. It is important to have a
mechanism in place for determining criticality.
Developers do not sufficiently understand the security
risk of widely used development tools. In one instance,
systems engineers wanted to use FTP for remote staging
of production input files. However, operational man-
agement specifically forbade the use of this utility as a
matter of policy because of the high number of security
compromises reported against this product with track-
ing organizations such as US-CERT (www.us-cert.
gov). Until a team was assembled to perform a security
risk assessment, the organization had no forum for
bringing the systems engineers and operational
management together to discuss the reasons for the pol-
icy and identify other alternatives potentially acceptable
to both groups. Once team members discussed the
issue, they selected another approach that could accom-
plish the same result while improving sustainment
security.
WHAT YOUR ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE DOING
The security challenges for systems in sustainment are
growing, and the risk of ignoring them is extremely
high. The most effective means of addressing these
challenges requires a team of participants from soft-
ware development, production operational support,
and sustainment working together to plan for a suc-
cessful production implementation. As part of the
planning process, a security risk assessment must be
performed1 to pinpoint potential security problems,
identify required protection activities, and assign
responsibility for timely completion of each activity.
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In October 2004, BBC News reported that 2,000 British
account holders lost £4.5 million in the previous
12 months, according to the British Association for
Payment Clearing Services (APACS). From October
2004 to October 2005, the number of new phishing
sites detected by the Anti-Phishing Working Group
increased from 1,142 to more than 4,300, while the
number of reported incidents increased to over 15,000.
Verifying the accuracy of such claims is difficult. The
average phishing Web site is online for less than a week
before being shut down. The lack of credible actuarial
data on losses renders any estimate subject to dispute.
However, what evidence there is suggests that the
prevalence of phishing attacks, and their financial
impact, is increasing at prodigious speed. Potential
losses were estimated to range from half a billion
dollars to nearly five times that figure, according to
a CNET News.com article published in late 2004 [1].
IDENTIFYING YOUR CUSTOMER
These numbers speak to the growing problem of reli-
ably identifying parties involved in business trans-
actions. This includes business-to-business (B2B)
transactions as well as business-to-consumer (B2C)
transactions. While consumer-to-consumer (C2C) trans-
actions are also at risk, as seen in Internet auction and
classified-ad sales, losses due to fraud in these transac-
tions currently represent a small fraction of total losses.
Furthermore, C2C transactions are frequently facilitated
or enabled by a third-party business, such as eBay
or PayPal. B2B transactions are generally validated
through authentication-and-encryption processes
enabled by cross-certification of specified “gateway”
machines at each business, or sometimes through use of
a “shared secret,” which is similar to a password, but
generally with explicit requirements regarding length,
character set, and frequency of changes.
The remaining category, B2C transactions, represents
an increasing threat to online trade, placing substantial
corporate funds at risk, as well as compromising the
financial security of customers, both online and offline.
It is hard to generate a reliable estimate of the number
of customers and amount of money at risk, as few com-
panies are willing to provide hard statistics on their
avoidable losses unless required by mandate. However,
recent legislation such as the California Senate Bill 1386
requires public notice of breaches in corporate data-
bases, subject to certain conditions. Such new legisla-
tion may have been instrumental in the decision of the
California Health and Human Services (HHS) agency
to notify the media about a recent breach of a database
containing the names, addresses, phone numbers, Social
Security numbers, and dates of birth of 1.4 million
California citizens. It is sobering to think how many
similar breaches may have occurred in recent years
without notification of the victims and potential victims
of identity theft.
IDENTIFYING YOUR VICTIM
One way that criminals can profitably leverage such
information is through phishing expeditions. Phishing
is a relatively new, and increasingly successful, form of
online fraud that exploits customer trust in the corpora-
tions with which they conduct financial transactions.
This trust is clearly implied by the willingness of most
people to place the majority of their money in a bank,
trusting that the bank will manage and secure those
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“CAN I SEE YOUR ID?”
DISCLAIMER: The opinions expressed herein represent those of the author and do not necessarily represent, nor are they intended to
represent, those of the author’s employer.
It is sobering to think how many breaches
may have occurred in recent years without
notification of the victims and potential
victims of identity theft.
©2006 Cutter Information LLCCUTTER IT JOURNAL  January 200624
funds in a fiscally responsible manner. Financial
institutions have generally done so, providing cus-
tomers with timely and reliable access to their deposited
funds. Unfortunately, they have also provided access to
those who have fraudulently represented themselves as
those same legitimate customers.
Early online consumer fraud consisted of a criminal
representing himself to a corporation as a legitimate
consumer, purchasing goods or services using a stolen
credit card number, taking delivery of the goods using
a disposable address (such as a commercial mailbox or
mail service), and then disappearing, leaving the credit
card holder with a significant debt and a damaged
credit rating. While financial institutions generally
release credit card holders from the majority of the debt,
it can take a substantial investment of time on the part
of the injured party to repair the damage to her credit
rating. In fact, reports suggest that it takes an average
of 40 work hours as well as the personal investment of
close to $1,000 in charges.
To commit these crimes, the criminal had to have access
to certain information about the targeted party, includ-
ing her full name, credit card number, and credit card
expiration date. The expiration date is a recent innova-
tion, added as an extra check that a potential customer
actually had the card in her possession at the time of
purchase. Most recently, vendors have begun requiring
buyers to provide the “card verification value” (CV2), a
three-digit number printed on the back of the credit
card. This allegedly serves to confirm that the buyer is
in possession of the actual card at the time of purchase.
However, this strategy suffers from the same inherent
weakness as using the credit card number or expiration
date to authenticate the customer’s identity. Each piece
of information can be recorded or duplicated without
the cardholder’s knowledge.
Clearly, if a criminal has access to a cardholder’s name,
credit card number, expiration date, CV2, and billing
address, he can impersonate the legitimate cardholder
in a telephone or Internet transaction. In fact, no matter
how many unique identifiers we require for online pur-
chases, those identifiers can be “harvested,” in some
cases from the very databases that they are being
authenticated against (as in the cases of identity theft
being perpetrated with the aid of an Experian insider
last year).
VICTIMS HELPING THE CRIMINALS
Furthermore, criminal organizations have discovered an
alternate method of harvesting information, known as
phishing. As mentioned earlier, this is a fairly new tech-
nique for fleecing the naïve. The name is derived from
the concept of “fishing” the Web for victims. 
The principle behind phishing is simple — just ask the
cardholder or account holder for the desired informa-
tion directly. By sending legitimate-appearing e-mails,
purportedly from the customer’s financial institution (or
other trusted businesses such as eBay or PayPal), crimi-
nals are able to request directly from the customer all
the information they need to access customer accounts.
The e-mails range from the inept (e.g., misspelling the
name of the bank!) to the professional and persuasive.
Some of the latter actually use graphics directly from
the Web site of the financial institution and exploit
obscure vulnerabilities in Web browsers to make it
appear that the customer has established a legitimate
connection to his bank. Given all of the recent news
items about hackers, Internet crime, and online fraud,
it’s not surprising that less Net-savvy customers would
promptly comply with the instructions in alleged secu-
rity alerts. Unfortunately, when they are asked to verify
their account information to prevent themselves from
being similarly victimized, they proceed to inadver-
tently enable the very crimes they are trying to avoid.
Recent thefts of vast databases of personal information
(the hard drive stolen from the Tri-West Healthcare
Alliance, a Russian cellular phone company’s client
database, California HHS, Experian, etc.) will likely
lead to further exploitation. The use of specific pieces of
information will be used to “validate” the legitimacy of
phishing exploits. Customers will receive an e-mail ask-
ing them to verify their account number, home address,
and phone number using the three-digit number written
on the back of their credit card. Many customers will
assume that the e-mail is legitimate because, after all,
the sender already had the credit card number. They
will not connect the information provided with a recent
compromise of a credit card processing facility, nor
will they understand the significance of the three-digit
number they provide as the last key criminals need to
defraud their credit card company.
Alternatively, some customers will be willing to provide
limited information in response to phishing attempts on
the grounds that the information they provide is insuffi-
cient to access their accounts. However, they are mak-
ing the implicit assumption that the information they
provide is being sent to their own bank, and that, on the
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off chance it ends up in the wrong hands, it is all the
information to which the unintended recipient will have
access. Unfortunately, due to data aggregation with
databases available on the black market, the phisher
will likely have already collected all the corollary infor-
mation, needing only the information requested in the
e-mail to exploit the target’s account.
HOW MUCH IS AT STAKE?
So how many people will fall for this trickery? The
unfortunate reality is that it doesn’t really matter. As
long as some small percentage of account holders fall
victim to this deception, it will continue to escalate.
This is a simple function of the high profits associated
with credit card fraud and identity theft, the minimal
marginal cost of collecting and using personal data on
cardholders, the comparatively small chance of appre-
hension, and the minimal deterrent effect of punish-
ment for this type of white-collar crime. Taking a
page out of John Allen Paulos’s excellent book A
Mathematician Reads the Newspaper [2], we can make a
reasonable estimate of the profitability of this criminal
enterprise.
Let’s begin by making several conservative assump-
tions. These numbers are intended to be within an order
of magnitude, but I make no guarantee as to their accu-
racy. If you disagree with one or more of these assump-
tions, feel free to substitute your own. (If you have data
to substantiate your assertion, please contact me at
the e-mail address at the end of this article, and I will
include any revision in future work.)
Based on these rough estimates, the potential profit
from a phishing expedition using the data from one
database would be in the neighborhood of $4,990,000.
Assuming that half of that money is paid off to associ-
ates, and that half of the remaining funds are lost laun-
dering the illicit gains, this still represents a tax-free
gain of over $1 million. Not bad for two weeks.
For any readers who feel that this is a generous estimate
of potential profits and that the response rate would be
significantly lower, consider the marginal cost of send-
ing out more spam. If the response rate is only one-
tenth of the estimate provided above, the perpetrators
need only send out 10 times as many phishing invita-
tions. The marginal cost of sending them, using one of
the five primary spamming networks existing today, is
inconsequential. Indeed, what cost there is will primar-
ily be absorbed by legitimate Internet users, who will
pay for the increased bandwidth utilization of these
undesired transmissions.
WHAT CAN WE DO?
Many experts have weighed in on this problem in
numerous forums. Technology solution companies,
ranging from large organizations such as Microsoft and
Cisco to small security startups, have offered numerous
tools to prevent phishing. Self-proclaimed “phishing
experts” have appeared worldwide, all of whom offer
their own unique perspective on this dilemma. Law
enforcement organizations seek appropriate means to
apprehend and punish the perpetrators.
Yet these circles of interest offer little help and direction
for the average businessperson. These groups typically
focus on the trends and the magnitude of the phishing
problem without offering concrete solutions. This prob-
lem is not going to go away, and it is unrealistic to
expect businesses to shut their doors in defeat, regard-
less of the magnitude and severity of the problem.
BUYING THE SILVER BULLET?
Some technology companies offer hardware and soft-
ware tools that their marketing teams claim will prevent
phishing. However, it doesn’t seem that any have
$10,000 Cost of stolen database of consumer credit
information on the black market
1,000,000 Number of records of consumer credit
information/database
100,000 Number of phishing e-mails sent/day
0.1% Percentage of phishing recipients to
respond (1:1,000 response rate based on
the assertion that there’s one born every
minute)
1 Average number of days for recipients to
respond (based on the assumption that if
the recipient does respond at all, she will
do so rapidly)
50% Percentage of respondents exploited (based
on the assumption that some respondents
will not be attractive prospects for one
reason or another)
$10,000 Average profit per exploited respondent
(Text continues on page 28.)
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SECURITY AND IDENTITY MANAGEMENT AT TATA CONSULTANCY SERVICES
by M. Vidyasagar 
Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. (TCS) is the oldest and largest IT company in India. Founded in 1968, TCS has recently seen an enormous
growth spurt. While TCS had always been the standard bearer for India’s IT industry, the company had grown quite slowly until a few
years ago, when the pace changed significantly, due in part to a much publicized and extremely successful IPO.
Until about 10 years ago, TCS had gotten by on the traditional models of security — simple, nonelectronic identification cards for
physical security, enforced by trained guards, and logical security provided by whatever password mechanisms came with our com-
puter systems. Interconnection between networks was not ubiquitous as it is now, and personnel traveling from one site to another on
business did not have too much trouble with physical access, because the guards could be instructed to recognize identification cards
issued by other locations. However, TCS personnel often had little or no access to network resources from their base location when
traveling.
Sometime during the last 10 years, physical access control gradually evolved into some sort of card-based electronic security in every
location. However, this happened at different points of time in different locations, and there was little homogeneity in these systems,
and certainly no integration. By this point, physical access for personnel traveling to other locations became a little more complicated,
because the access control mechanisms were not integrated.
There were other problems. It was not only the size of the organization that was dictating communication needs — the industry itself
was changing so that everyone expected access to ever larger amounts of information, with ever decreasing latency. This started to
present a serious problem in information security.
THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’
All this had to undergo pretty significant changes in order to accommodate the spurt in growth that TCS was planning. We had a much
larger number of locations in India now, and we had also opened development centers in South America, Hungary, and China, apart from
the existing locations in the US, the UK, and elsewhere.
It was no longer possible, or advisable, to treat security and identity in the comfortable but “old world” fashion to which we were
accustomed. We needed to put in place technologies that would help this new, much larger organization deal with its size and ensure
its security.
What this all boiled down to is that we needed to create a well-managed, information-rich environment in which all TCS stakeholders
could collaborate in real time and to use this environment as a basis for the next generation of enterprise management within TCS. It
quickly became obvious that we would have to take a very long-term view of our needs and evolve a solid, future-proof foundation on
which the organization could run. We called this foundation the Enterprise Management Program (EMP). 
The EMP takes an integrated view, touching on everything from IT infrastructure to collaborative knowledge management tools and
processes. For the remainder of this piece, I will focus only on those aspects of EMP that relate to security.
ENABLING THE BUSINESS TO RUN SECURELY
The security stream of the EMP effort was set up to benchmark TCS’s security processes with the international best and to equip the work
environment at TCS with the best technologies available to ensure a secure and reliable workplace. There are several subareas within the
security stream where significant work has been done and continues to be done. I will highlight some of them here.
Identity Management and User Provisioning
The identity management group has created a centralized system for identity creation and management. All possible workflows
pertaining to identity within the organization — new employee creation, an employee leaving or retiring, location change (aka
“transfer”), role change, and so on — have been provided for. The system allows accounting and auditing of access rights and also
offers a dual control check to enable a double sign-off for access rights changes if needed.
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SECURITY AND IDENTITY MANAGEMENT AT TATA CONSULTANCY SERVICES (continued)
Password management, including the ability to securely communicate passwords for new users, is available, as is the synchronization of
user provisioning on various systems (including Ultimatix [TCS’s intranet portal] and the Lotus Notes system). 
The identity management system uses smart cards and public key infrastructure (PKI); all associates receive a digital identity in the form
of a digital certificate. The certificate is stored on a smart card, which is the primary device for establishing user credentials. 
Access Control
The EMP includes a comprehensive model of access control, using PKI for nonrepudiation of accesses to key resources. Single sign-on
(SSO) and directory services are implemented, and the associated directory services component also provides a globally scalable
repository of users’ business privileges. Resource owners grant or revoke access, and the process is automated using the identity
management system. Some of these rights may be delegated if necessary.
Single Sign-On
EMP also implements an SSO product across the board to alleviate the need to remember multiple passwords (which, as we all know, is
a leading cause of weak passwords). The system provides for multiple and alternative methods for sign-on, centralized credential stores,
and various settings for synchronization options and local cache expiration. User session inactivity timeouts, failed login attempt tracking
and response (such as user account disablement), real-time logging of all authentication and sign-on events, and detailed audit-related
reports are available. Most importantly, the system supports multiple authentication options, including strong passwords, smart cards,
and biometrics.
Other Features
In addition to the above, the EMP security stream provides for a security framework within which a central security operations center
monitors all network- and security-related activity. There are also detailed incident management procedures defined to identify, prioritize,
and track all incidents at various levels and to coordinate incident response activities.
SECURITY: INTEGRAL TO THE ENTERPRISE
The EMP has been a major effort, spanning more than three years of work by a talented team consisting of 27 very experienced
professionals who owned various “streams,” including security. More than anything, the EMP effort has shown us how important it is
to take a holistic view of the enterprise and all of its needs. In the process, we learned that security is not an “add-on” but part of the
design of any IT-related endeavor today.
M. Vidyasagar is Executive VP (Advanced Technology) of TCS and is based in Hyderabad, India. At TCS, Dr. Vidyasagar’s charter is to set up and develop
the Advanced Technology Centre (ATC), which works on cutting-edge technologies of relevance to the IT industry. At present, ATC is involved in three
distinct activities: life sciences, e-security, and open source/Indian languages. The e-security division has developed solutions for end-to-end network
security and is the originator of the Dhruvam, an enterprise PKI solution. This group has also supplied digital certificates and/or security solutions to more
than 30 prestigious clients, including the Bombay Stock Exchange, the Reserve Bank of India, and the Department of Company Affairs. 
Dr. Vidyasagar holds a doctorate in electrical engineering from the University of Wisconsin, USA. He is the author of 10 books and more than 130
technical papers. Dr. Vidyasagar has won several awards in recognition of his research, including the “Distinguished Service Citation” from the University
of Wisconsin. He was named an IEEE Fellow at age 35, one of the youngest to receive this honor. He is also a Fellow of the Indian Academy of Sciences,
the Indian National Science Academy, the Third World Academy of Sciences, and the Indian National Academy of Engineering. 
Dr. Vidyasagar can be reached at Tata Consultancy Services, No. 1, Software Units Layout, Madhapur, Hyderabad 500 081, India; Tel: +91 40 5567
3001; Fax: +91 40 5567 2222; E-mail: m.vidyasagar@tcs.com.
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offered a compelling and sustainable solution. If they
had, major world financial institutions would gladly
have invested in it, as that would be a clear market
differentiator in today’s economic climate.
Unfortunately, the detective measures currently on the
market face the same challenges that antivirus vendors
and spam-prevention companies have faced for years.
Each of these segments is trying to market a plug-and-
play “solution” to mitigate a threat caused by an intelli-
gent adversary. By the time a solution gets to market,
there is a group of dedicated, well-funded, and highly
motivated professionals working to defeat that solution.
Having seen the amount of money at stake, it is no sur-
prise that as soon as a technology is developed to detect
and prevent a particular type of phishing attack, these
adversaries develop new and creative means of fulfill-
ing their criminal goals. Many attempts at addressing
the problem of phishing are futile against newer attack
methodologies. In fact, some have the unfortunate side
effect of aggravating the problem or creating a new one.
For instance, the use of Bayesian filters to detect word
patterns indicative of spam or phishing attempts have
caused many spammers and phishers to send their com-
munications as images. These are both harder to filter
and have a greater impact on our limited bandwidth.
Entire industries are chasing their tails in trying to
resolve this problem. The tools and techniques for
identifying phishing attacks are costly to develop,
implement, and maintain. The hardware, software,
and personnel costs associated with deployment of
such tools in large and complex environments are billed
directly against the bottom line of the institution or are
passed on to the customers in the form of increased
fees. And as I’ve said, as soon as any solution is imple-
mented, there is a substantial chance that new tech-
niques of attack will be discovered, restarting the
vicious cycle. 
While this suggests a gloomy picture, let’s consider
changing our perspective. Perhaps the current focus
on phishing itself is not the best approach to solving
the problem.
SHOOTING AT THE RIGHT TARGET
So many companies are focused on phishing as the
problem to be solved. It would be more productive to
recognize phishing as the symptom of a systemic flaw
— the lack of effective identification and authentication,
which results in the crimes of impersonation and
identity theft.
Why is this type of crime increasing so dramatically?
As the information systems on which our society
depends are becoming more integrated with our busi-
ness processes and with each other, we are becoming
more dependent on the services they provide. As accu-
rate identification of the individual requesting these
services is a prerequisite for appropriate allocation of
resources, one might presume that as we place increas-
ing reliance on the information systems behind our
business processes, we would strengthen the authenti-
cation processes to ensure that access to them is only
granted to appropriate personnel. However, in authen-
ticating people, we continue to use the same personal
information that we have used for decades. Unfortu-
nately, it is no longer enough. 
As a society, we have to reduce our reliance on presum-
ably unique, person-specific information as an adequate
form of authentication. As soon as our information-
processing devices exceeded our own capacity to store
and retrieve person-specific information on a large
scale, we should have seen that any form of authentica-
tion based on rote memorization would no longer be
sufficient. Computers are better at it than we are, and
computers will work for criminals as willingly as for
law-abiding citizens. What we need is a better way to
authenticate the individual.
A PROMISING APPROACH 
So how can we ensure that the correct individual is
authenticating the use of a credit card, or the transfer
of funds, or the signing of a contract? Two-factor
authentication is one promising approach.
Two-factor authentication, also referred to as strong
authentication, is based on the combination of a physi-
cal device, such as a key, with a piece of information,
such as a password. The key is something you have,
which you would presumably miss if it were lost
or stolen. The password is something you know. By
requiring something you know in conjunction with
something you have, you mitigate the risk of losing
the key. While you will not be able to gain access to
resources without the key, anyone who gains possession
What we need is a better way to authenticate
the individual.
(Text continued from page 25.)
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of the key will be unable to capitalize on it, as he would
lack the corresponding password. Some forms of two-
factor authentication may substitute a personal
attribute, such as a fingerprint or a voiceprint, for
the key. This is referred to as something you are.
Two-factor authentication is not a new idea. In fact, it
has been in use worldwide for the past two decades.
Most banks now issue ATM cards, which allow the
cardholder to access her bank account remotely by
using one of over a million ATMs scattered around the
globe. Clearly, effective authentication is a business
requirement. This requirement is met by issuing the
account owner an ATM card that stores a unique code.
This card, something you have, can be used in conjunction
with an assigned or user-selected PIN, a four-digit code.
This code is something you know. The combination pro-
vides adequate authentication for both banks and cus-
tomers to rely upon for financial transactions.
One known weakness with the two-factor authentica-
tion method used by ATMs is its susceptibility to a
replay attack. That is, since the PIN is unchanging,
someone who can intercept the transmission between
the point-of-sale device (such as an ATM card scanner
at a drug store) and the authentication-and-funds-
authorization services could potentially “replay” the
communications sequence and withdraw an equal sum
from the cardholder’s account. This weakness can be
addressed through the use of one-time keying (OTK).
The ATM card could contain a processor capable of
computing temporary codes based on a time function
and a unique key. If the ATM card’s internal clock is
synchronized with the clock on an authentication
server, with protected access to a corresponding key,
the authentication server could verify the authenticity
of the unique, nonrepeating code, and thus verify pos-
session of the card. This mitigates the risk of a replay
attack, as any code used is only valid for a short time.
We Can’t Afford Not To
This type of user authentication, though available
from vendors for some years, has not been utilized
by financial organizations for customer authentication
due to economic infeasibility. However, the price point
of time-synchronized two-factor authentication in
an acceptable form, such as a credit card, has decreased
to the point where it is economically infeasible for such
organizations not to consider it. More to the point, it is
now a viable technology and would result in significant
long-term savings for financial institutions and their
customers.
Now that the cost of two-factor authentication (on a
customer basis) is less than 10% of the provisioning cost
of setting up a new customer account, and the cost of
the supporting technological infrastructure is substan-
tially less than the annual losses written off to phishing
and related fraud, corporations should be responsible
for insulating their customers from fraudulent scams.
It is in the customer’s best interest and the economy’s
best interest.
Moreover, it is in the best interest of financial organiza-
tions to invest in the security of their customers, for
that is an investment in their own future. As customers
recognize the importance of credible authentication
mechanisms to their financial security, the use of effec-
tive two-factor authentication by financial institutions
will initially be a significant business differentiator. As
such devices become more prevalent, it will become a
business requirement.
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There is no official definition of spam, yet most people
know it when they see it. We consider spam to be
advertisements or, more generally, all the e-mails that
we do not want to appear in our mailbox. Formally,
spam has three defining characteristics: it uses elec-
tronic means such as e-mail, is unsolicited, and comes
in bulk. 
The two official definitions that best describe spam are
unsolicited bulk e-mail (UBE) and unsolicited commer-
cial e-mail (UCE). UBE is the quintessence of spam:
messages sent to a large number of recipients who
have either not requested to receive them, or have
requested to receive mail only once and later asked not
to be included in the list of recipients. Any message
received after such a request is also UBE. UCE, on the
other hand, refers specifically to commercial messages
trying to promote products, services, or companies.
UBE therefore covers more kinds of spam, such as
political spam, frauds, and malicious e-mails.
The term UCE is most frequently used in the US, where
national legislation distinguishes this type of spam from
the rest. For instance, the most important US spam law
— the CAN-SPAM1 Act of 2003 [5] — introduces a
number of requirements for UCE, such as including
opt-out instructions, displaying the sender’s physical
postal address, and labeling the e-mails. Likewise, it
also prohibits the use of deceptive subject lines and
false e-mail headers, the transmission of UCE after a
recipient’s objection within 10 business days, the har-
vesting of e-mail addresses, and dictionary attacks.2
According to the final amendments of the European
Directive for e-Privacy 2002/58/EC [8], commercial 
e-mails within the European Economic Area (EEA)
are not allowed without recipients’ prior consent. But
although antispam legislation is advancing, the spam
phenomenon is always one step ahead, mutating into
new forms of annoyance over mobile communications,
instant messaging, Internet telephony (e.g., VoIP), and
spoofing of Internet search engines. 
CURRENT COUNTERMEASURES
Apart from the exasperation it introduces into the
everyday life of Internet users, spam also produces
extra costs for businesses, well hidden in direct and
indirect costs. Most global spam research shows that
spam ranged from 40% to 60% of total e-mails for the
year 2004. Some pessimistic studies indicate that rates
are between 60% and 75% of total e-mails for the year
2005, if one includes viruses and other unwanted con-
tent [13, 19]. Some believe that the situation is improv-
ing, due mainly to technological antispamming efforts
(filtering, sender authentication, etc.) and law enforce-
ment [15]. Nevertheless, the amount of spam is still
unacceptably high.
Not all unsolicited e-mail is spam, of course. Many
companies and organizations — including banks, bro-
kerage firms, insurance companies, and universities —
depend heavily on e-mail communication to contact
their customers or members and to provide information
about their services. Still, there is no easy and direct
way for business and person-to-person communication
to be distinguished from spam. As a result, antispam
measures embrace a variety of different approaches. At
the conceptual level, we can divide the antispamming
methods into the following categories:
 The technological approach — tries to eliminate
spam by blocking it using computers’ software
and/or hardware
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Are We Ready to Face Next-Generation Spam?
by Charalampos Z. Patrikakis and Anastasios A. Pallas 
SPAMALOT
1We should note that, in this case, the term SPAM does not refer to spam messages but rather to (Non-)Solicited Pornography And
Marketing.
2A dictionary attack is a technique for trying to guess an authentication mechanism or other secret by running through a list of likely
possibilities, often a list of words from a dictionary (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictionary_attack).
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 The legal approach — emphasizes legislation that
prevents the action of spamming and imposes
penalties for those who transgress the laws
 The social approach — focuses on educating 
e-mail users about the harm of spam, how their
behavior contributes to the problem, and how they
can change their everyday routine to reduce the
associated risks
We can further distinguish technology-based antispam
methods based on where they reside — the server side
(i.e., on the mail transport agent of an ISP or on dedi-
cated outsourced hosting providers) or the client side
(i.e., the end user’s computer). Yet another viewpoint is
to categorize technological antispam methodologies into
three complementary approaches [12]:
1. Preventing spammers from harvesting e-mail
addresses
2. Blocking in the sending stage 
3. Blocking at the receiving stage 
Preventing Spammers from Harvesting E-Mail
Addresses
Users can employ a number of practices to prevent their
e-mail addresses from being included in spammers’ lists.
One tactic for hiding an e-mail address from spammers’
robots is to replace the @ symbol and use instead the
word “at” or the equivalent HTML entry “&#64;”.
Likewise, one can replace “.” with the word “dot”
or “&#46;” (e.g., myname@mycompany.com can be
written as “myname at mycompany dot com” or
“myname&#64;mycompany&#46;com”). Another
important issue is to avoid posting to Web newsgroups,
forums, and other untrusted services on the Web with
your private or company e-mail. Instead, use a free-
hosting e-mail address from Yahoo or Hotmail.
Protecting your e-mail address seems to be the most
effective countermeasure available [18]. 
Blocking in the Sending Stage
It would be ideal if we could block spam in the sending
stage, but so far the only effective measure here is to
keep up to date on security, be protected against spy-
ware intrusions, and regularly check SMTP and proxy
relays in order to prevent potential spammers from
transforming your server into a zombie. 
Blocking at the Receiving Stage 
Blocking at the receiving stage (i.e., antispam filtering)
is an effective approach, although it too contains some
flaws. It is done primarily through two means: sender
authentication checks and content analysis. The first
involves targeting the sender of the e-mail and
establishing the trustedness of the route. Domain Name
System Blacklists (DNSBLs), which contain abused 
e-mail servers like SMTP and proxy relays along with
SPF (a new standard for Sender Policy Framework),
make it easier to identify spoofs and distinguish
authentic messages from forgeries. 
Tests that are based on content are mainly classified
into message header tests (let us exclude here sender
authentication), tests on Spam URL Real-time Block
Lists (SURBLs), fingerprint analysis tests or distributed
checksums (like DCC), lexical analysis tests, and,
finally, statistical analysis tests (like Bayesian filtering).
It is amazing that SpamAssassin 3.0.x. has 234 different
tests (including sender authentication) that are based on
the header, representing 39% of the total 600 tests per-
formed. As far as the effectiveness of SURBLs is con-
cerned, the rates of spam identification are quite high,
reaching up to 87% (i.e., 87% of spam contained a URL
that was listed in a SURBL) [3, 24]. 
Having said this, it appears that Bayesian filtering is
one of the most prominent methods of spam blocking
(at the receiving stage), and almost all antispam ven-
dors have adopted it. This kind of filtering relies on
adaptive filtering algorithms, which have several note-
worthy benefits. They can be customized to individual
users’ characteristic spam and legitimate messages; they
can generate a filter automatically from a body of cate-
gorized messages rather than requiring human effort to
explicitly develop rules; and they can be implemented
in a very few number of lines of code [14]. Bayesian fil-
tering works surprisingly well, and due to its personal-
ization characteristics, spammers have a very difficult
time adapting to it. However, Bayesian-based antispam
filters require some attention to work well. This mainly
has to do with the training of the filter, which requires
the processing of a vast number of messages. We should
also keep in mind that antispam content filtering intro-
duces significant CPU workload and delays, especially
for large volumes of e-mails.
Wanted: A Holistic Approach
So which one of these antispam methods is the best?
The only accurate answer would be: none alone. Each
one has advantages and shortcomings, and none of
them is 100% effective at blocking spam while maintain-
ing an acceptable false positive rate. Even the Bayesian
statistical analysis method (undoubtedly the current
best-of-breed approach to spam control) is not perfect. 
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Most of the methods in use today adopt a technological
approach to the spam problem. What is required is an
approach that encompasses technology along with
policy-based decision making and user education. Any
approach to controlling spam obviously needs support
from the major stakeholders such as ISPs, and it should
be aligned with existing antispam laws. We believe pro-
posals that encompass multilayered spam filtering tech-
nologies are more likely to be effective against the spam
phenomenon.
SPAM GOES WIRELESS
Spammers’ activity clearly demonstrates that they are
trying to take advantage of every low-cost broadcast
medium available. A mobile phone is something per-
sonal, and the last thing you want is inconvenience and
solicitations on your phone. For spammers, however, it
is just another, even more powerful, medium for pro-
moting their “goods,” and we can argue that it is actu-
ally the leading direct marketing media available today.
Spam in mobile communications can take the form of
the well-known SMS message, MMS message, or even 
e-mail, which is the favorite application of users of
Web-enabled mobile phones [1]. A significant percent-
age of spam on mobile phones asks the user to call a
phone number, which may be a premium-rate service or
simply a message of a commercial nature that is consid-
ered threatening or intrudes upon a user’s privacy. Yet
another phenomenon of mobile spam is to send mes-
sages in the form of a virus that is harmful or attempts
to change the handset settings. These mobile viruses,
which are able to affect critical components of the
device and effectively make it unusable, have increased
rapidly since their first occurrence in June 2004. In 2005,
there were more than 100 such viruses [9]. 
Unfortunately, a recent study shows that both con-
sumers and mobile operators expect mobile spam to
become a critical issue in the next two years [4], and
they worry about the possible impact of mobile spam
on consumers. The good news, however, is that both US
and European spam laws [5, 8] already cover mobile
communication, thus providing a legal protection
mechanism.
In the same study [4], consumers worldwide indicated
that mobile spam negatively impacts their opinion of
a mobile network operator and that they would rather
change their provider than apply for a new cell phone
number. In addition, consumers perceive mobile mar-
keting messages from mobile operators as mobile spam,
which opens up a controversial issue regarding the
legitimacy of operators sending their customers
messages for services, competitions, and news. The
European Directive for e-Privacy 2002/58/EC [8]
requires companies to obtain the consent of the recipi-
ent before they send commercial messages. However,
there are certain exceptions to this opt-in rule; a com-
pany is allowed to use information acquired during the
customer’s purchase of a mobile device and/or service
to promote similar products or services. Since the com-
pany has informed the customer about the possible use
of personal data for such purposes (a statement that is
either well hidden in the contract or is considered as
de facto and overlooked), it can use this information to
send “legitimate” spam messages. Stopping these mes-
sages requires the customer to explicitly opt out (which
the law states he may do at any time free of charge), but
doing so is not really convenient though mobile phones.
Tracking a mobile user’s location is another sensitive
topic, as the ability to know the exact location of a user
at all times raises the specter of “Big Brother.” Privacy
concerns are mainly the consequence of the low security
levels of mobile and wireless networks, which increases
the fears of further m-commerce-related spam activities.
This is actually the same concern previously expressed
about e-commerce, now exacerbated by the fear of
extensive tracking and profiling of customers in the
mobile world. 
What’s the difference for spammers? They now have the
ability to “offer” unsolicited location-based services to
the target group they want to reach. Of course, their
actions imperil legitimate mobile marketing campaigns,
which can be beneficial for all players, as they can offer
consumers personalized information based on time,
location, and interest [23]. 
SPAM IN INSTANT MESSAGING (SPIM)
SPIM is a new flavor of spam that has appeared in
instant messaging (IM) systems such as ICQ and MSN
Messenger. Spammers gather information from a user’s
directory, sign on with misleading names, and send
unsolicited messages. Likewise, in a situation identified
as “messenger spam,” spammers exploited a security
vulnerability of Windows “Messenger Service”
designed for system and networks administrators to
send notifications over a Windows network. As a result,
annoying pop-ups were opening on computers con-
nected to the Internet, displaying security warnings and
threats instructing the user to follow a certain URL to
work around the “problem.” Microsoft, confirming this
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threat, issued a security workaround for all Windows
operating systems [3, 16, 17].
But what makes SPIM unique? It’s the speed of action,
since IM, unlike e-mail, is a real-time communication
suite. SPIM can be carried out in the form of an attack
(e.g., a computer worm) whose speed can be measured
in a few minutes and that can spread much faster than
security solutions can respond. That’s why SPIM is
likely to become a very popular means of spamming
in the near future. Indeed, based on a recent US survey,
30% of online adults who use IM have already been
subjected to SPIM [11, 20].
SPAM OVER INTERNET TELEPHONY (SPIT)
Telephony over the Internet, or Voice over IP (VoIP),
means cheaper phone calls, which is a great prospect
for consumers and businesses alike. On the other hand,
it also means that audio advertising messages can be
sent out for very little cost, much like spam in e-mail
communication. Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT) is
potentially one of the most imminent threats associated
with VoIP (once the technology becomes widely used),
and we can compare it with telemarketing campaigns.
How does it work? Spammers discover the IP addresses
used for voice, upload an audio file (the spam) to a
server, and send it to a large number of voice mail 
in-boxes. If you are already nervous about spam
through e-mail, you have good reason to get mad
about voice spam, because you will have to listen to it! 
Some people may argue that this scenario is unlikely.
The victims of e-mail and IM spam are just one click
away from a spammer’s destination Web site, but what
about SPIT? How exactly are SPIT senders going to earn
money? Unluckily, there are two potential ways to
achieve that: (1) they can persuade the listener to call
them back (we should not forget that even in the case
of untrustworthy e-mail, where the victim has time to
think, there are still people who respond); or (2) trick
her to press a number and let her speak with a real
salesperson, who knows well how to handle the rest of
the successful contact [6, 7]. In any case, having costs
near zero, SPIT senders have nothing to lose!
SPAM GOES FROM ANNOYING TO THREATENING 
With the rise of phishing, spam has shifted from annoy-
ing to threatening. Phishing refers to the acquisition of
Internet users’ credit card numbers, bank account num-
bers, and other sensitive personal information by means
of bogus messages purporting to be from legitimate
businesses. Because the referred Web sites look practi-
cally identical to the companies’ real sites, users are
misled into divulging critical information, such as user-
names and passwords. 
According to a recent study conducted by the Anti-
Phishing Working Group (APWG), the most targeted
industry is the financial sector, though there was no
lack of phishing activity targeting customers of ISPs and
retail e-shops and even donors to the Red Cross after
Hurricane Katrina! The report further states that the
average time online for a scam Web site is five to six
days, and the US, China, and South Korea together
share more than 50% of the hosting phishing Web sites
worldwide. Europe and Canada were reported to be the
new future targets of phishing spammers [2]. With the
number of unique phishing Web sites constantly rising
and methodologies varying from confirming personal
information, to keystroke logging, to legitimate URLs
redirecting users to deceit Web sites (a phenomenon
called “pharming” [22]), phishing attacks are expected
to impact consumers’ confidence in e-banking and 
e-commerce [2, 10].
POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES FOR THE NEWEST SPAM
When attempting to tackle the mobile spam problem,
we should first underline that there is much to learn
from our experience with e-mail spam, although there
are a number of differences in each situation. For
instance, mobile spam messages, in contrast to e-mail
spam messages, are hard to filter at the client end. Thus,
efforts should focus on prevention and blocking mes-
sages before they reach customers’ phones. In addition
to compliance with high-security standards, mobile
carriers have to prove their sensitivity to privacy con-
cerns in order to promote m-commerce and other value-
added mobile services. Due to the limited number of
mobile operators (versus ISPs), the possible counter-
measures listed below can be adopted to combat mobile
spam. Some of them have already proven very effective
in Japan, where operators have dealt with vast amounts
of mobile spam. These countermeasures include:
 Blocking messages sent to a large number of
recipients
If you are already nervous about spam
through e-mail, you have good reason to get
mad about voice spam, because you will have
to listen to it! 
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 Blocking messages if a number of recipients are
invalid or a dictionary attack is discovered
 Blocking messages from specified sources
(i.e., domains), similar to DNSBLs
 Blocking access to premium-rate services included
in the spam messages (which is something similar
to URLs identified in SURBLs)
 Limiting the amount of messages sent daily from a
single mobile phone
 Providing the users (free of charge) with the ability to
block specific phone numbers or domains of e-mail
senders, or even all e-mails from the Internet
 Bringing spammers and sponsors of the spamming
action immediately to court and being committed to
taking legal action
Regarding SPIM, some basic protection rules for IM
users are [21, 25]:
 Activating alerts when other users add you into their
contact lists
 Blocking strangers from seeing when you are online
 Allowing only people you know to send you
messages
 Avoiding opening attachments, even from people
you know if you haven’t confirmed that they sent
you something
 Finding out how to activate the scanning of all files
with your installed antivirus program
Finally, in order to be protected against phishing and
pharming [10], some good practices are: 
 Staying up to date with antivirus software and
firewalls on every computer you use
 Installing an antispam tool on your computer, 
even if your e-mail provider offers one
 Setting up a public e-mail address to be used when
entering chat rooms, forums, online dating sites,
job search sites, auctions, and generally surfing
the Internet
 Checking out the privacy policy before giving away
any personal information, even to trustworthy
companies
 Not unsubscribing to suspicious lists, as you are just
confirming that your e-mail address is valid
 Not replying to any e-mail that asks you to verify
your personal data
 Never giving out sensitive information such as
passwords and credit card numbers, Social Security
number, and bank account numbers to forms inside
e-mail messages or to Web sites without a valid
security certificate
Ultimately, none of the above guidelines and practices
will totally solve the spam problem, but each one is a
step in the right direction and can save us from further
troubles. It’s essential for IT directors, managers, and
technical staff to be aware of the risks posed to security
and productivity by spam. Lifetime training programs
for employees along with informational leaflets and
published tips on the corporate intranet are just some
ideas for educating users on ways they can reduce both
personal and enterprise risks from spam.
CONCLUSION
The new mobile “cousins” of spam presented in this
article seem to be just in their infancy, but that doesn’t
guarantee they won’t be as troublesome as e-mail
spamming in a very few years. Spam over Internet and
mobile telephony, for instance, would be significant
problems inside a corporate voice network, especially
as they can raise common deficiencies such as latency,
dropped calls, or distortion, which can lead to the dis-
ruption of the phone service, a mission-critical applica-
tion for all enterprises. 
We have witnessed how difficult the regulation of 
e-mail spamming has proved to be, since this is gener-
ally opposed to businesses’ aim of increased sales. In
contrast to what many researchers and antispamming
companies initially thought, the contribution of users
in combating the spam phenomenon is critical. We
strongly believe that spam tends to be a social and ethical
issue rather than a technological issue only, and regulation
efforts should be focused on that aspect, too. Let us not
forget that all problems on the Internet start as a small
snowball but quickly turn into a huge snowstorm. Isn’t
it time to rethink our strategy?
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